Condorcet//Approval: Difference between revisions
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{{merge from|Condorcet/Approval}} |
{{merge from|Condorcet/Approval}} |
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| ⚫ | '''Condorcet//Approval''' or '''C//A''' is an election method by which the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the [[Approval voting|approval]] winner is elected. Approval could be specified in various ways. The double-slash notation signifies that one eliminates all losers of the first step before performing the second step. It is also possible to limit contenders to members of the Smith or Schwartz set, resulting in '''Smith//Approval''' or '''Schwartz//Approval'''. |
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When approval is implemented such that it isn't possible to rank some candidate X over another candidate Y without also approving candidate X, Condorcet//Approval and similar methods have good burial resistance. |
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===Explicit/Implicit Approval=== |
===Explicit/Implicit Approval=== |
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===Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance=== |
===Favorite Betrayal criterion compliance=== |
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{{Main|Improved Condorcet Approval}} |
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[[Approval voting]]'s satisfaction of the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the [[tied at the top]] rule. This results in the [[Improved Condorcet Approval]] method. However, this variant technically isn't [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]-compliant. |
[[Approval voting]]'s satisfaction of the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] can be preserved in Condorcet//Approval by using the [[tied at the top]] rule. This results in the [[Improved Condorcet Approval|Improved Condorcet Approval (ICA)]] method. However, this variant technically isn't [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]-compliant. |
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==Satisfied Criteria== |
==Satisfied Criteria== |
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