Condorcet//Approval: Difference between revisions

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 ::Within that set, the alternative with the most winning votes against the approval bar is the winner.
+== Notes ==
+If a voter ranks A>B>C>D>E, and approves only A and B, but C, D, and E are the only candidates in the Smith Set, then this voter would have no influence over who wins in the Smith Set in Smith//Approval. Thus, a modification could be that every voter is assumed to approve their favorite candidate(s) in the Smith Set. Alternatively, if this voter had approved A, B, and C, and all 3 of them were the only candidates in the Smith Set, then again they'd have no influence over which Smith Set candidate wins. So it's also possible to assume every voter disapproves their least favorite(s) In the Smith Set.
+Smith//Approval can be done on rated ballots with an approval threshold based on scores (i.e. a voter could approve everyone they scored a 5/10 and up), making it similar to [[Smith//Score]].
 == See also ==