Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
Add strategic implications (mostly about Condorcification)
(Popping the example out of the Template:Image frame and into a #Detailed example section.) |
(Add strategic implications (mostly about Condorcification)) |
||
Line 218:
Approval Voting (and thus Score Voting when all voters use only the minimum or maximum score) is equivalent to a traditional Condorcet method where a voter must rank all candidates 1st or last. Score Voting where some voters give some candidates intermediate scores can be treated as Approval Voting using the [[KP transform]], and thus treated as a traditional Condorcet method in the same way as Approval Voting.
== Strategic implications ==
Every Condorcet method is susceptible to burial in at least some elections, and Condorcet is also incompatible with [[later-no-harm]] and [[later-no-help]]. However, if a method has the property that a coordinated majority can always force its outcome, then prefixing a Condorcet step to that method can never increase the proportion of elections where strategy pays off.<ref name="Green-Armytage Tideman Cosman pp. 183–212">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage | first=James | last2=Tideman | first2=T. Nicolaus | last3=Cosman | first3=Rafael | title=Statistical evaluation of voting rules | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | publisher=Springer Science and Business Media LLC | volume=46 | issue=1 | date=2015-08-11 | issn=0176-1714 | doi=10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0 | pages=183–212|url=http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/strategy-utility.pdf}}</ref><ref name="Durand Mathieu Noirie 2014">{{cite web | last=Durand | first=François | last2=Mathieu | first2=Fabien | last3=Noirie | first3=Ludovic | title=Making most voting systems meet the Condorcet criterion reduces their manipulability | website=Inria | date=2014-06-17 | url=https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01009134 | access-date=2022-01-12}}</ref>
== Criticism ==
| |||