Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]]) |
* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]]) |
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* Possibly less [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] (voters may [[Burying|bury]] with frequency); this is because the Condorcet criterion implies failure of [[later-no-help]]. |
* Possibly less [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] (voters may [[Burying|bury]] with frequency); this is because the Condorcet criterion implies failure of [[later-no-help]]. |
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** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]],<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity"> |
** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]],<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity">{{cite journal| title = Monotonicity and single-seat election rules| last = Woodall| first = Douglas R.| journal = Voting matters| volume = 6| pages = 9–14| year = 1996|url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE6/P4.HTM}}</ref> which may incentivize [[bullet voting]] |
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**Non-Condorcet methods (usually referring to [[Score voting]]) may be more [[Smith-efficient]] than actual Condorcet methods due to <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-14}}</ref>. |
**Non-Condorcet methods (usually referring to [[Score voting]]) may be more [[Smith-efficient]] than actual Condorcet methods due to <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-14}}</ref>. |
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***[Rebuttal] [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] are less susceptible to this issue than other Condorcet methods; in the example provided, strategic voters could place their [[approval threshold]] in such a way as to elect the CW. |
***[Rebuttal] [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] are less susceptible to this issue than other Condorcet methods; in the example provided, strategic voters could place their [[approval threshold]] in such a way as to elect the CW. |