Distributed Multi-Voting: Difference between revisions

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The DMV in any case meets the [[Independence of Worst Alternatives|IWA]].
 
===ResistanceTactical tovote strategic votesresistance===
 
Meets Honesty criterion under the same assumptions as the [[Distributed Voting#Tactical vote resistance|Distributed Voting]].
The DMV is extremely resistant to tactical votes, that ignore the election results.
 
This system also tries to satisfy the Perfect Honesty criterion, by applying a conversion of the vote which serves to drastically reduce the deviation from the honest vote.
The way in which the converted vote is obtained means that the voter doesn’t have a great interest in accumulating their points all on the same candidate. In cases [1] and [2] it’s noted that the addition of 1 point on B, left the score of A practically unchanged in the converted vote, but in case [2] it obtained 303 points for B (same speech observing the case [3] or even [5] ); this means that the voter has an interest in expressing his preference towards B. At the same time, the voter doesn’t even have the interest of giving his limited points to candidates he doesn’t really support (reduced dispersion of points) .
The DMV can be subject to tactical votes in which candidates change the order of their preferences based on the results of the elections; to use these tactical votes you must:
 
Example
* are sufficiently aware of the expected results of an election (hard).
Candidates: [A B C D E]
* fully understand the functioning of the DMV.
Honest vote: [50 30 15 5 0]
* be willing to take risks, because these tactical votes can backfire on the voter if they fail.
Tactical vote: [90 6 3 1 0]
Honest converted vote: [1118 820 486 176 0] Points sum = 2600
Tactical covert vote: [1434 622 390 153 0] Points sum = 2600
Absolute difference: [316 198 96 23 0] Points sum = 633
633 out of 2600 is around 25%.
 
On average, about 75% of the vote is honest at the start of the counting, even if the voter used a tactical vote. A good representation of interests is also provided.
Overall in practical contexts it’s very difficult to create an effective strategic vote in the DMV.
 
'''Other properties'''
 
The way in which the converted vote is obtained means that the voter doesn’t have a great interest in accumulating their points all on the same candidate. In cases [1] and [2] it’s noted that the addition of 1 point on B, left the score of A practically unchanged in the converted vote, but in case [2] it obtained 303 points for B (same speech observing the case [3] or even [5] ); this means that the voter has an interest in expressing his preference towards B. At the same time, the voter doesn’t even have the interest of giving his limited points to candidates he doesn’t really support (reduced dispersion[[Vote of pointssplitting]]) .
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
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