Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems| Cardinal voting system]]. |
Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems| Cardinal voting system]]. |
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In the [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] part, this voting method consists of the [[Score voting|Score Voting]] in which all candidates outside the [[Smith set]] are first excluded as winners. In the [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] part, the more preferred the winning candidate is in a vote, the more the weight of that vote is decreased in the choice of the next winner. |
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[[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]] |
[[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]] |
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IIA: when candidates X and Y aren't part of the Smith set, they are excluded without being evaluated, therefore it's not possible to know which are the group's preference between X and Y. The group's preference between X and Y are evaluated only when they are both in the Smith set and in this case it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate doesn't change the group's preference between X and Y . |
[[IIA]]: when candidates X and Y aren't part of the [[Smith set]], they are excluded without being evaluated, therefore it's not possible to know which are the group's preference between X and Y. The group's preference between X and Y are evaluated only when they are both in the [[Smith set]] and in this case it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate doesn't change the group's preference between X and Y . |
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All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the Smith set. |
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]]. |
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- add one more candidate into the Smith set isn't a big problem because that additional candidate must then beat all the other candidates in point 4 of the procedure (and if he manages to beat them all it makes sense that he wins). |
- add one more candidate into the [[Smith set]] isn't a big problem because that additional candidate must then beat all the other candidates in point 4 of the procedure (and if he manages to beat them all it makes sense that he wins). |
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- removing a candidate from the Smith set is only possible when that candidate lose all the head-to-head with the candidates contained in the Smith set. This actually becomes a problem only if the excluded candidate is the one who really should have won. |
- removing a candidate from the [[Smith set]] is only possible when that candidate lose all the head-to-head with the candidates contained in the [[Smith set]]. This actually becomes a problem only if the excluded candidate is the one who really should have won. |
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Below is an example in which, through tactical votes, it's possible to bring out a candidate, who should have won, from the Smith set (making him lose). |
Below is an example in which, through tactical votes, it's possible to bring out a candidate, who should have won, from the [[Smith set]] (making him lose). |
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===Tactical votes=== |
===Tactical votes=== |