Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]] |
! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]] |
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! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]] |
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]] |
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! rowspan=1 | IIA* |
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! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]] |
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]] |
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! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotone]] |
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotone]] |
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IIA*: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate than the candidates in X and B, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B. |
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[[IIA]]: when candidates X and Y aren't part of the [[Smith set]], they are excluded without being evaluated, therefore it's not possible to know which are the group's preference between X and Y. The group's preference between X and Y are evaluated only when they are both in the [[Smith set]] and in this case it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate doesn't change the group's preference between X and Y . |
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All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]]. |
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]]. |