Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions

Content added Content deleted
(Change formulas in points 5 and 6 of the vote count.)
m (Criteria table added)
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W1=W0+100\left( 1-\frac{e}{M}\right)
W1=W0+100\left( 1-\frac{e}{M}\right)
\end{equation}</math>
\end{equation}</math>

(the formula shown above is temporary and may be subject to change)


By repeating this process several times, you can get as many winners as you like, which will be those removed in point 5.
By repeating this process several times, you can get as many winners as you like, which will be those removed in point 5.
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==Criteria==
==Criteria==


{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center"
Criteria met by DSV (single-winner):
<!-- criteria headers -->

|- style="font-size:80%;"
*[[Majority criterion]]
! rowspan=1 |
*[[Majority loser criterion]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left: 2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
*[[Mutual majority criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Majority loser criterion|Maj. loser]]
*[[Condorcet criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual maj.]]
*[[Condorcet loser criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]
*[[Smith criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Cond. loser]]
*[[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
*[[w:Independence of clones criterion|Independence of clones criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]]
*[[Monotonicity criterion]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]]
*[[w:Reversal symmetry|Reversal symmetry]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]]
*[[Pareto criterion]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotone]]

! rowspan=1 | [[Consistency criterion|Consistency]]
Criteria not met by DSV (single-winner):
! rowspan=1 | [[Participation criterion|Participation]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Reversal symmetry|Reversal<br>symmetry]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no<br>Help]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Favorite betrayal criterion|Favorite<br>betrayal]]
|- style="font-size:80%;"


<!-- Methods -->
*[[Participation criterion]]
|-
*[[Consistency criterion]]
! [[Distributed_Score_Voting|DSV<br>single-winner]]
*[[Later-no-help criterion]]
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
*[[Favorite betrayal criterion]]
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
|}


The first two unmet criteria are derived mainly from the fact that DSV wants to ensure the victory of the candidate who wins all the head-to-head (when it exists).
[[Consistency criterion|Consistency]] is not satisfied because [[Distributed Score Voting|DSV]] wants to guarantee the victory of the candidate who wins in all heads-to-head matches.


The last two unmet criteria can instead generate tactical votes, described below.
[[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no-Help]] isn't satisfied because [[Distributed Score Voting|DSV]] wants to guarantee the defeat of candidates who aren't in the Smith set. This can generate tactical votes, described below.


===Tactical votes===
===Tactical votes===