Distributed Voting: Difference between revisions
Tactical vote resistance better described
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===Tactical vote resistance===
'''Hypotheses'''
Each voter, based on his own interests, creates the following 2 sets of candidates:
* Winner Set := set containing a quantity of favorite candidates equal to or less than the number of winners.
* Loser Set := set containing the candidates who aren't part of the Winner Set.
Example
Candidates: [A B C D E]
Honest vote: [50 30 15 5 0]
Tactical vote (1 winner): [90 6 3 1 0]
Tactical vote (2 winners): [60 36 3 1 0]
'''Single winner'''
Meets the [[Honesty criterion]] (on hypotheses) because:
* at each [[Honesty criterion|Update Steps]] of the count, in which a candidate with points is removed, the tactical vote decreases the deviation from the honest one.
* the [[Honesty criterion|Honesty Step]] occurs when the candidate in the Winner Set is removed or when all the candidates in the Loser Set are removed. In the best case, the [[Honesty criterion|Honesty Step]] can occur in the first [[Honesty criterion|Update Steps]].
* the [[Honesty criterion|Honesty Step]] is always present because in the single winner, during the counting, all candidates are always removed from at least one of the two Sets.
Example - 1 winner
Candidates: [A B C D E]
Honest vote: [50 30 15 5 0]
Tactical vote: [90 6 3 1 0]
A is removed and the tactical vote becomes equal to the honest one, that is:
Vote: [60 30 10 0]
'''Multiple winner'''
Satisfy the [[Honesty criterion]] (on hypotheses) only if are removed first, all the candidates of the Winner Set or first all those of the Loser Set.
===Equality===
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