First preference Copeland

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First preference Copeland is a variant on the Copeland method. It was devised by Forest Simmons in 2006. [1]

In first preference Copeland, each candidate is assigned a penalty: the sum of first preferences of the candidates that beat the candidate pairwise. The candidate with the least penalty wins.

First preference Copeland passes Smith because supposing otherwise, that some candidate Y not in the Smith set wins; then for a candidate X in the Smith set, Y is beaten by every candidate X is beaten by, and some more. Thus Y's penalty must be higher than X's, so Y couldn't have been the winner.

However, FPC fails both the monotonicity criterion and independence of clone alternatives.

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References[edit | edit source]

  1. Simmons, F. (2006-12-30). "Clone proofing Copeland". Election-methods mailing list archives.