Gerrymandering: Difference between revisions
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'''Gerrymandering''' is the practice of splitting voters into certain districts in such a way as to maximize the chances of a certain set of candidates winning. For example, if there are 5 districts, with the population being 60% loving Vanilla ice cream, and 40% loving Chocolate ice cream, it may be possible, if all of the Vanilla voters live in the same areas, to waste Vanilla voters' votes by putting them all in two districts, and spreading the Chocolate voters out so that a majority of the remaining 3 districts are Chocolate voters, so that the majority of the winners are Chocolate-loving representatives. |
'''Gerrymandering''' is the practice of splitting voters into certain districts in such a way as to maximize the chances of a certain set of candidates winning. For example, if there are 5 districts, with the population being 60% loving Vanilla ice cream, and 40% loving Chocolate ice cream, it may be possible, if all of the Vanilla voters live in the same areas, to waste Vanilla voters' votes by putting them all in two districts, and spreading the Chocolate voters out so that a majority of the remaining 3 districts are Chocolate voters, so that the majority of the winners are Chocolate-loving representatives. |
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== Cardinal methods == |
== Cardinal methods == |
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It has been argued by some that among single-winner or bloc voting methods, Approval voting and Score voting best resist gerrymandering, in part because they pass the [[Consistency criterion|consistency criterion]], and in part because they are claimed to result in the election of consensus candidates. Here is a counterexample:<blockquote>Isn't the problem inherent with gerrymandering though less distortion of the overall political centroid itself and more an exploitation of majority mechanics within the legislature, which are basically impossible to get rid of? |
It has been argued by some that among single-winner or bloc voting methods, Approval voting and Score voting best resist gerrymandering, in part because they pass the [[Consistency criterion|consistency criterion]], and in part because they are claimed to result in the election of consensus candidates. Here is a counterexample:<blockquote>Isn't the problem inherent with gerrymandering though less distortion of the overall political centroid itself and more an exploitation of majority mechanics within the legislature, which are basically impossible to get rid of? |
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