Gibbard's theorem

Revision as of 21:49, 25 November 2021 by RobLa (talk | contribs) (Crude adaptation of the intro from w:Gibbard's theorem: (<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gibbard%27s_theorem&oldid=1033066316>). More work to be done....)

From w:Gibbard's theorem: [1]

Wikipedia has an article on:

In the fields of mechanism design and social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem is a result proven by philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973.[2] It states that for any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold:

  1. The process is dictatorial, i.e. there exists a distinguished agent who can impose the outcome;
  2. The process limits the possible outcomes to two options only;
  3. The process is open to strategic voting: once an agent has identified their preferences, it is possible that they have no action at their disposal that best defends these preferences irrespective of the other agents' actions.

A corollary of this theorem is Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The main difference between the two is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is limited to ranked (ordinal) voting rules: a voter's action consists in giving a preference ranking over the available options. Gibbard's theorem is more general and considers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal: for example, voting systems where voters assign grades to candidates. Gibbard's theorem can be proven using Arrow's impossibility theorem.

Gibbard's theorem is itself generalized by Gibbard's 1978 theorem[3] and Hylland's theorem, which extend these results to non-deterministic processes, i.e. where the outcome may not only depend on the agents' actions but may also involve an element of chance.

References

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gibbard%27s_theorem&oldid=1033066316
  2. Gibbard, Allan (1973). "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 587–601. doi:10.2307/1914083. JSTOR 1914083.
  3. Gibbard, Allan (1978). "Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes" (PDF). Econometrica. 46 (3): 595–614. doi:10.2307/1914235.