Impartial culture: Difference between revisions
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This model is not particularly realistic, but it's mathematically easy to work with. |
This model is not particularly realistic, but it's mathematically easy to work with. |
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As the number of candidates approaches infinity, the election becomes increasingly close to a perfect tie. Effects that depend on elections being tie-like in some way (like the lack of a Condorcet winner) will thus become increasingly frequent in many candidates under impartial culture. Tsetlin et al. found that |
As the number of candidates approaches infinity, the election becomes increasingly close to a perfect tie. Effects that depend on elections being tie-like in some way (like the lack of a Condorcet winner) will thus become increasingly frequent in many candidates under impartial culture. Consistent with this observation, Tsetlin et al. found that, of a broad class of election models, impartial culture maximizes the chance of there being no Condorcet winner.<ref name="Tsetlin Regenwetter Grofman 2003 pp. 387–398">{{cite journal | last=Tsetlin | first=Ilia | last2=Regenwetter | first2=Michel | last3=Grofman | first3=Bernard | title=The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | publisher=Springer | volume=21 | issue=3 | year=2003 | jstor=41106568 | pages=387–398 | url=https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bernard-Grofman/publication/24064463_The_impartial_culture_maximizes_the_probability_of_majority_cycles/links/0fcfd51266f8e241fa000000/The-impartial-culture-maximizes-the-probability-of-majority-cycles.pdf | access-date=2022-03-26}}</ref> |
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