Majority criterion: Difference between revisions
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(Added "majority criterion" due to modern use as well as use on EM. Added citation using "majority criterion" to refer to this criterion, as well.) |
(Added reference for "majority favorite criterion" usage as well. It's a bit weak: Durand et al use "majority criterion" in their later published paper, but the only other ref I could find is Dopp, which subject matter could distract from the point.) |
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{{wikipedia|Majority favorite criterion}} |
{{wikipedia|Majority favorite criterion}} |
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The '''majority criterion''' or '''majority favorite criterion''' is a criterion for evaluating [[voting system]]s. It can be most simply thought of as "if a candidate would get >50% of the first preferences ([[FPP]] vote), that candidate should win". In other words, if a majority selects a candidate as their unique 1st choice, this candidate must win.<ref name="i696">{{cite journal | last=Schulze | first=Markus | title=A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | volume=36 | issue=2 | date=2011 | issn=0176-1714 | doi=10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 | page=297|url=http://www.9mail.de/m-schulze/long.pdf}}</ref> |
The '''majority criterion''' or '''majority favorite criterion''' is a criterion for evaluating [[voting system]]s. It can be most simply thought of as "if a candidate would get >50% of the first preferences ([[FPP]] vote), that candidate should win". In other words, if a majority selects a candidate as their unique 1st choice, this candidate must win.<ref name="i696">{{cite journal | last=Schulze | first=Markus | title=A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | volume=36 | issue=2 | date=2011 | issn=0176-1714 | doi=10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 | page=297|url=http://www.9mail.de/m-schulze/long.pdf}}</ref><ref name="u698">{{cite web | last=Durand | first=François | last2=Mathieu | first2=Fabien | last3=Noirie | first3=Ludovic | title=Making most voting systems meet the Condorcet criterion reduces their manipulability | website=Archive ouverte HAL | date=2014-06-17 | url=https://hal.science/hal-01009134/ | access-date=2024-06-25}}</ref> |
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== Example == |
== Example == |
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