Minimal Defense criterion: Difference between revisions

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(Linking to Stephen Eppley. I should probably create a Steve Eppley redirect while I'm at it.)
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The '''Minimal Defense criterion''' for [[voting system|voting systems]] is similar to and was inspired by the [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]]. It is stronger than the SDSC and implies it.<ref name="VenzkeImpl">{{cite web|url=http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/080317.html|title=A method satisfying Minimal Defense and much Later-no-harm|website=Election-methods mailing list archives|date=2005-03-05|last=Venzke|first=K.}}</ref>
 
== Statement of Criterion ==
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In particular, even if all of the voters preferring ''A'' to ''B'' each prefer many other different candidates to ''A'', '''Minimal Defense''' guarantees that these voters don't need to insincerely rank ''A'' above or even equal to these other candidates to ensure that ''B'' won't be elected.
 
== References ==
<references />
 
== External links ==
* [http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley The Maximize Affirmed Majorities (MAM) voting procedure (MAM)[https://web.archive.org/web/20160828020944/http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley 2016 archive of Eppley's page])
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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