Mono-add-top criterion: Difference between revisions
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Any method which satisfies the [[Participation criterion]] also satisfies Mono-add-top. |
Any method which satisfies the [[Participation criterion]] also satisfies Mono-add-top. |
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Woodall has shown that it is impossible for a method to satisfy all three of [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], the [[Plurality criterion]], and Mono-add-top. It is not known whether Mono-add-top is compatible with [[Smith set|Smith]]. |
Woodall has shown that it is impossible for a method to satisfy all three of [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], the [[Plurality criterion]], and Mono-add-top. [[Minmax|Minmax(margins)]] passes Condorcet and mono-add-top, but not Plurality.<ref name="Woodall 1997 pp. 81–98">{{cite journal | last=Woodall | first=Douglas R. | title=Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules | journal=Discrete Applied Mathematics | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=77 | issue=1 | year=1997 | issn=0166-218X | doi=10.1016/s0166-218x(96)00100-x | page=90|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/Woodall97.pdf}}</ref> It is not known whether Mono-add-top is compatible with [[Smith set|Smith]]. |
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==References== |
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[[Category:Voting system criteria]] |
[[Category:Voting system criteria]] |
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Latest revision as of 08:49, 7 April 2022
Mono-add-top is a relative criterion which requires that if candidate X is the winner of the election, then adding additional ballots which rank X strictly above all other candidates must not reduce the probability that the winner is still X.
The name "Mono-add-top" was invented by Douglas Woodall.
Any method which satisfies the Participation criterion also satisfies Mono-add-top.
Woodall has shown that it is impossible for a method to satisfy all three of Condorcet, the Plurality criterion, and Mono-add-top. Minmax(margins) passes Condorcet and mono-add-top, but not Plurality.[1] It is not known whether Mono-add-top is compatible with Smith.
This page is a stub - please add to it.
References
- ↑ Woodall, Douglas R. (1997). "Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules" (PDF). Discrete Applied Mathematics. Elsevier BV. 77 (1): 90. doi:10.1016/s0166-218x(96)00100-x. ISSN 0166-218X.