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Mutual majority criterion: Difference between revisions
Linking to w:Mutual majority criterion
(Show that DAC also fails independence of mutual majority-dominated alternatives; link the counterexample to the more general Left, Center, Right scenario.) |
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{{wikipedia}}
The '''Mutual majority criterion''' is a criterion for evaluating [[voting system]]s. Most simply, it can be thought of as requiring that whenever a [[majority]] of voters prefer a set of candidates (often candidates from the same political party) above all others (i.e. when choosing among ice cream flavors, a majority of voters are split between several variants of chocolate ice cream, but agree that any of the chocolate-type flavors are better than any of the other ice cream flavors), someone from that set must win (i.e. one of the chocolate-type flavors must win). It is the single-winner case of Droop-[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]].
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