Information for "Non-compulsory support criterion"

Basic information

Display titleNon-compulsory support criterion
Default sort keyNon-compulsory support criterion
Page length (in bytes)2,299
Namespace ID0
Page ID296
Page content languageen - English
Page content modelwikitext
Indexing by robotsAllowed
Number of redirects to this page0
Counted as a content pageYes
Number of subpages of this page0 (0 redirects; 0 non-redirects)

Page protection

EditAllow all users (infinite)
MoveAllow all users (infinite)
DeleteAllow all users (infinite)
View the protection log for this page.

Edit history

Page creatorimported>Cymru
Date of page creation17:50, 5 September 2005
Latest editorPsephomancy (talk | contribs)
Date of latest edit05:25, 2 February 2019
Total number of edits30
Recent number of edits (within past 180 days)0
Recent number of distinct authors0

SEO properties

Description

Content

Article description: (description)
This attribute controls the content of the description and og:description elements.
The Non-compulsory support criterion was devised in 2005 by Thomas Smith. A voting method satisfies the Non-compulsory Support criterion if the ballot provides a means for the voter to exclude one or more candidates from supportive ranking or rating, and by doing so, not causing harm to any supported candidates or help to non-supported candidates. Methods that satisfy this criterion include Approval voting, Range voting, Bucklin voting, truncatable STV methods and Borda count that is voter truncated from the low rankings. Methods that do not satisfy this criterion include Condorcet methods, plurality voting, standard Borda count, and modified Borda count (voter truncated from the high rankings). For example, Approval and Range voting allow the voter to rate any candidate with a zero, which effectively does not give those candidates any advantage and does not harm the chances of the positively rated candidates. Voter-truncated Borda count from the low rankings allows the voter to not rank any candidate, thus giving those candidates no points in the tallies, but gives the supported candidates the same high-ranking point values as a standard Borda count. Plurality voting does not satisfy ncsc because only one candidate can be selected for a ballot slot, so there is no means to exclude even one candidate without not voting at all in that ballot slot. Standard STV methods (like standard IRV) satisfy ncsc because the voter is allowed to truncate, neither harming ranked candidates, nor helping those that are truncated away on the ballot. However, because STV methods do not satisfy the monotonicity criterion or the participation criterion, not ranking a candidate can lead to an outcome where a ranked candidate was harmed or an unranked candidate was helped as a result of a particular truncated ballot.
Information from Extension:WikiSEO