Participation criterion: Difference between revisions
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<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4> |
<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4> |
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<p>[[Plurality voting]], [[Approval voting]], [[Cardinal Ratings]], [[Borda count]], and |
<p>[[Plurality voting]], [[Approval voting]], [[Cardinal Ratings]], [[Borda count]], and Woodall's [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions|DAC]] and [[Descending Solid Coalitions|DSC]] methods all pass the Participation Criterion. [[Condorcet method | Condorcet methods]], [[Majority Choice Approval]], and [[IRV]] fail.</p> |
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''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org'' |
''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org'' |
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* [http://electionmethods.org/ Election Methods Education and Research Group] |
* [http://electionmethods.org/ Election Methods Education and Research Group] |
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* [http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE6/P4.HTM Woodall's DAC method] |
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[[Category:Voting system criteria]] |
[[Category:Voting system criteria]] |
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Revision as of 05:01, 23 March 2005
Statement of Criterion
Adding one or more ballots that vote X over Y should never change the winner from X to Y.
Complying Methods
Plurality voting, Approval voting, Cardinal Ratings, Borda count, and Woodall's DAC and DSC methods all pass the Participation Criterion. Condorcet methods, Majority Choice Approval, and IRV fail.
Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org
See Also
- Voting system
- Monotonicity criterion
- Condorcet Criterion
- Generalized Condorcet criterion
- Strategy-Free criterion
- Generalized Strategy-Free criterion
- Strong Defensive Strategy criterion
- Weak Defensive Strategy criterion
- Favorite Betrayal criterion
- Summability criterion