Participation criterion: Difference between revisions
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''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org'' |
''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org'' |
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== Notes == |
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The Participation criterion offers one way of justifying [[Score voting]] being no worse than [[FPTP]]: voters can never be hurt by casting an FPTP-style vote ([[bullet voting]]) relative to not voting. Many other voting methods, such as [[IRV]] and [[STAR]] (and possibly [[Condorcet]] fail even this weaker version of Participation. Example for IRV: |
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30+2 A>B |
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31 B |
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49 C |
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If 2 of the 32 A>B voters show up and bullet vote A, then B is eliminated and then C wins. But if they don't vote, then A is eliminated and then B wins. |
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Note that the Participation criterion doesn't say a voter should be able to benefit in some circumstances by voting, nor does it quantify such a thing. For example, a voting method which randomly chooses one of the candidates regardless of the votes would pass Participation, despite not giving voters any power. Voting methods like [[Score]] and [[FPTP]] can have this quantified because they are based on similar systems of increasing a candidate's "quality number", with each voter only being able to increase the number for a given candidate to a certain maximal amount. |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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