Proportional representation: Difference between revisions
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[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] is praised for ensuring that voters get what would intuitively be considered an at least somewhat proportional outcome, but is criticized for focusing too much on giving a voter one "best" representative, rather than letting that voter have influence in electing several representatives. |
[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] is praised for ensuring that voters get what would intuitively be considered an at least somewhat proportional outcome, but is criticized for focusing too much on giving a voter one "best" representative, rather than letting that voter have influence in electing several representatives. |
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Many of the properties of these systems can be derived from their party list simplifications. The [[Balinski–Young theorem]] implies that not all desirable properties are possible in the same system. Theile type systems reduce to [[Highest averages method|divisor methods]] which means that adding voters or winners will not change results in undesirable ways. The other three reduce to [[Largest remainder methods]] which obey Quota Rules but adding voters or winners may change outcomes in undesirable ways. One such way is failure of [[Participation criterion]]. It is not clear which is a fundamentally better choice since Quota Rules are |
Many of the properties of these systems can be derived from their party list simplifications. The [[Balinski–Young theorem]] implies that not all desirable properties are possible in the same system. Theile type systems reduce to [[Highest averages method|divisor methods]] which means that adding voters or winners will not change results in undesirable ways. The other three reduce to [[Largest remainder methods]] which obey Quota Rules but adding voters or winners may change outcomes in undesirable ways. One such way is failure of [[Participation criterion]]. It is not clear which is a fundamentally better choice since Quota Rules are intimately tied with some definitions of proportionality. |
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=== Criticisms === |
=== Criticisms === |