Sequential proportional approval voting: Difference between revisions
Sequential proportional approval voting (view source)
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== Notes ==
SPAV's [[Party list case|party list case]] is [[D'Hondt]], because its reweighting is based on D'Hondt's divisors.<ref name="Janson 2016">{{cite arXiv | last=Janson | first=Svante | title=Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods | date=2016-11-27 | eprint=1611.08826|class=math.HO}}</ref>
In the same way that [[Approval voting]] is considered by almost nobody to be worse than [[FPTP]], though some question the magnitude of the improvement, many find SPAV to be unambiguously better than [[SNTV]]. This is because it satisfies a stronger [[Weak forms of PSC|weak form of PSC]], which allows solid coalitions to gain proportional representation with less need for coordinated strategy. This makes it less likely to result in anomalous results (i.e. less likely that a minority wins a majority of seats using [[Vote management|vote management]], for example). If every voter bullet votes, SPAV becomes SNTV.
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