Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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49 Republicans </blockquote>The chicken dilemma criterion assumes that the Democrat-top voters are trying to withhold their support from the Green Party, and thus it punishes their "lack of cooperation" by electing the Republicans. Yet really, the Democrats don't support the Green Party in this example, and the Green Party-top voters merely wished to elect either the Green Party or the Democrats, and would not have wanted their support for their 1st choice to hurt their 2nd choice. So it can be argued that in fact, a voting method should fail the CD criterion and always elect the "non-cooperating" faction's preferred candidate to avoid this spoiler effect.
Most [[:Category:Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods|defeat-dropping Condorcet methods]], [[Rated method|rated methods]], and to some extent, [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] fail the criterion.
[[Reciprocal Score Voting]] would not give the Democrats a benefit by not supporting the Greens, as they would get no support themselves. Presumably, if a significant portion of Green Party voters support Democrats then a significant portion of Democrats would also support Greens, as the overlap between voter bases should be mostly symmetrical. Therefore, it cam be argued such strong asymmetries are unrealistic to begin with.
See also [[Asset voting]] for some discussion on this; the majority can be thought of as a "majority semi-solid coalition".
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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