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Majority Choice Approval: Difference between revisions

imported>Homunq
imported>Homunq
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The [[Condorcet criterion]] is satisfied by MCA-VR if the pairwise champion (PC, aka CW) is visible on the ballots. It is satisfied by MCA-AR if at least half the voters at least approve the PC in the first round. Other MCA versions fail this criterion.
 
[[Strategic nomination|Clone Independence]] is satisfied by most MCA versions. In fact, even the stronger [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]] is satisfied by MCA-A, MCA-P, MCA-M, and MCA-S. TheClone weakerindependence (andis technicallysatisfied incompatible)along butwith relatedthe ISDAweaker isand satisfiedrelated [[ISDA]] forby MCA-VR and MCA-AR, if ISDA-compliant Condorcet methods (ie, Schulz) are used to choose the two "finalists". Using simpler methods to decide the finalists, MCA-VR and MCA-AR are not clone independent.
 
The [[Later-no-help criterion]] and the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] are satisfied by MCA-P. They're also satisfied by MCA-AR if MCA-P is used to pick the two finalists.
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