Talk:IRV Prime: Difference between revisions
→Arrow/IIA: new section
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Hello, Condorcet and Later-no-harm are incompatible - see proof in Woodall.<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity">D R Woodall, [http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE6/P4.HTM "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules"], ''[[Voting matters]]'', Issue 6, 1996</ref> Could you run your method through the example provided there and update the article?
[[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 09:12, 31 July 2021 (UTC)
== Arrow/IIA ==
As I understand it, the reference to satisfying Arrow's theorem is meant to imply that the method satisfies IIA. But I don't think that's possible.
In a Condorcet cycle like this:
{{ballots|
35: A>B>C
30: B>C>A
25: C>A>B}}
Who wins in IRV Prime? If it's A, then eliminating B (irrelevant candidate) should make C win by majority rule. If it's B, then eliminating C makes A win; and if it's C, then eliminating A makes B win. I may be missing something, though! :-) [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 22:22, 31 July 2021 (UTC)
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