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Vote For and Against: Difference between revisions

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m (Rename the criterion that the last preference of a majority can't be elected, the majority loser criterion)
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In the three-candidate case, VFA does satisfy the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and in one respect also Clone Independence: When the winner in a two-candidate race is ''cloned'', this cannot cause the loser of the two-candidate race to be elected.
 
Although VFA performs rather poorly with respect to criteria, it is as easy to count as [[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]] or [[Approval voting]], neither of which satisfies the ''Majority Last PreferenceLoser criterion'' or (even in the three-candidate case) the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]].
 
==== Variant satisfying Participation ====
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