User:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote: Difference between revisions
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'''Standard Vote does IRV first (2 or 3 times) and pairwise comparisons second (only between runoff winners).'''
'''Standard Vote''' (abbreviated as '''SV''') is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. Thereby addressing the unfairness of a single runoff voting system by identifying when the runner-up has a [[spoiler|spoiler effect]] on the election and doing something about it.▼
▲
This method modifies [[Instant-Runoff Voting|instant runoff voting]] (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with [[later-no-harm]] safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions claim to improve on simple IRV by: more fairly counting a voter's honest opinion, making this system more monotonic ([[Monotonicity]]), reducing the failure rate for the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]] (IIA), eliminating [[Center-squeeze]], and making the practice of [[Favorite Betrayal]] unnecessary.▼
▲This method modifies
▲== Description ==
Voters rank the candidates using as many ranking levels as there are candidates, or to a limit as specified by the electing authority. The Google spreadsheet demonstrator (link below) has five levels of ranking which makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.
If no
If no
Here's a shared link to the demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows) (you need to be signed on to a Google Account). ▼
'''Proof of concept'''
▲Here's a shared link to
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UR7yJyN3XYszE0LYRe9J-RE1YbEdOHvuq1X2-LOaEac/edit#gid=664199959
▲== Tie breakers ==
▲[[Random Voter Hierarchy]] (RVH) is used for each "random draw". Ideally these values are determined at the "instant" the counting begins, giving candidates and voters nothing to apply a strategy to. If two or more candidates have the same rank on any number of ballots, this tie is re-ranked by "random draw" en masse. All votes will fall the same way throughout all elimination rounds in all runoffs (all occurrences of A=B will either all count as A>B or all count as B>A). All ties encountered during elimination rounds will be decided by a different "random draw". This will cause ties between candidates to be decided in the same candidate's favor throughout all elimination rounds. In pairwise ties between runoff winners, the earlier winner's count takes precedence over a subsequent winner's count. In the scenario of the paradoxical tie, the candidate to be elected will be decided by yet another different "random draw".
For those who can’t access a Google Sheets spreadsheet, here are
2: Convert equal ranking on ballots to ranked choices (using the 1st random draw to order equally ranked choices).
3: Execute a “normal” IRV runoff to identify the 1st winner and a runner-up
4: Execute a 2nd IRV runoff without the runner-up from step 3, identifying a 2nd winner
5: If the same alternative wins both runoffs, elect that alternative.▼
7: Execute a 3rd runoff without the 1st winner from step 3, identifying a 3rd winner
8: If the same alternative wins the 2nd and 3rd runoffs, elect that alternative.▼
10: If the 3rd winner beats the 1st winner, one on one, elect the 3rd winner.
11: Elect one of the three runoff winners (3rd random draw to decide).
'''Examples comparing SV to IRV'''
This example shows a paradoxical tie. To be fair, SV gives each candidate an equal chance of election.
4 A>B
Line 28 ⟶ 64:
2 C>A
IRV elects A. SV decides a three way tie (step 11).
The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze. Candidate C is elected.▼
▲The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze.
4 A>C
Line 36 ⟶ 75:
2 C
IRV elects A. SV elects Candidate C (step 8).
The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary. C wins. 2 A>C turning into 2 C>A is not needed.▼
▲The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary.
4 A>C
Line 44 ⟶ 86:
2 C>B
IRV elects B. SV elects C (step 8). No need to turn 2 A>C into 2 C>A.
The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing to be monotonic▼
▲The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing
8 A
Line 52 ⟶ 97:
4 C>B
IRV and SV elect B.
When 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal):
6 A
▲For those who can’t access a Google Sheets spreadsheet, here are real short descriptions of Standard Vote's eleven step process.
'''2 C'''
▲1: Create 3 random lists of the alternatives for use in steps 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11.
5 B>A
4 C>B
▲3: Execute a “normal” IRV runoff to identify the 1st winner and a runner-up. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties in elimination rounds.
IRV elects A. SV decides who wins the three way tie (step 11).
▲4: Execute a 2nd IRV runoff without the runner-up from step 3, identifying a 2nd winner. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties.
▲5: If the same alternative wins both runoffs, elect that alternative.
6 A
▲7: Execute a 3rd runoff without the 1st winner from step 3, identifying a 3rd winner. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties.
'''2 A>C'''
▲8: If the same alternative wins the 2nd and 3rd runoffs, elect that alternative.
5 B>A
▲9: If the 2nd winner does not lose to the 3rd winner, one on one, elect the 2nd winner.
4 C>B
▲10: If the 3rd winner beats the 1st winner, one on one, elect the 3rd winner.
IRV elects B. SV decides who wins in the three way tie (step 11).
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