User:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote

From electowiki

Standard Vote does IRV first (2 or 3 times) and pairwise comparisons second (only between runoff winners).

Standard Vote (abbreviated as SV) is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. This addition to IRV addresses the unfairness inherent in a single runoff voting system, by identifying when the runner-up has a spoiler effect on the election and doing something about it.

This method modifies Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with later-no-harm safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions improve on simple IRV by: making this system more monotonic (Monotonicity), reducing the failure rate for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), eliminating Center-squeeze, and making the practice of Favorite Betrayal unnecessary.

Plural Voting: IRV’s plural voting issue is why I made Standard Vote. That issue is about voters whose first choice is for the runner-up and because of that they never get the chance for their lesser choices to count like everyone else that loses. It appears that some voters who lose get two or more votes and some get only one. It’s not fair to voters. It is also unfair to candidates who never get those votes. Standard Vote fixes the plural voting problem by using multiple runoffs.

A better ballot: Voters cast a more full and more honest opinion than IRV by allowing a voter the opportunity to indicate two or more candidates are tied. Standard Vote keeps IRV’s principle of later no harm by ensuring a voter’s lesser preference never causes their more preferred preference to lose. By giving voters up to five choices on a ballot, voters don’t have to guess which one candidate has a chance to beat the one candidate they don’t want.

Greater fairness: Keeping the simple parts of IRV and adding greater fairness creates a better voting system. Popular and successful negative election campaign strategies used in IRV and First Past the Post will not work. Standard Vote fixes the spoiler effect, center squeeze and voter betrayal. A candidate trying to win is left with only one campaign strategy for success. That’s to promote themselves as better than everybody else. That is all voters have ever wanted candidates to do.

Additional runoffs: Because there will be one or two additional runoffs, this process must decide which runoff winner is better. In the spirit of later-no-harm, repeating runoff winners are elected (steps 5 and 8) and different winners will be compared one on one (in steps 6, 9 and 10). In the event of a tie, the earlier runoff winner will be considered better than a later winner.

Description

The number of preferences could be more or less than five. But that may be about as far as any voter will go and still be happy with the result. The Google spreadsheet demonstrator (link below) has five levels of ranking which makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.

Ballots are collected and recorded.

There are up to eleven steps needed to find the best and fairest result

Step 1: When a voter opines that candidate A is equally preferred to candidate B, it is important that the votes are not split in a counting. Only one of the equal candidates gets those votes first. To be fair, who gets these votes first must be settled by random draw. When an elimination round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. When the final round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. To be fair, a tie must be broken by a random draw that is separate from the draw for equally preferred. When Standard Vote finds a cyclical tie, it’s a tie which must be broken by a random draw separate from draws for equally preferred and elimination.

Step 2: By allowing voters to vote candidate A equal to candidate B, the voters don’t split the vote by accident. In the spirit of one voter one vote, IRV makes each voter decide. Standard Vote makes these tied votes all go the same way first, and when that candidate loses, the votes go the other way second. That’s runoff voting at work in two different ways. Standard Vote is more fair to the candidates.

Step 3: The first runoff gives a normal IRV result. It’s later-no-harm for candidates. As for the issue of plural voting, the voters having voted for the runner-up as their first preference are the only voters who have lost and not had their lesser preferences counted. Stop here and it’s not the same playing field for all candidates and all voters. it’s not fair.

Step 4: The runner-up in the first runoff is eliminated in the first round of the second runoff. This gives the voters who voted for the runner-up as their first preference a fair chance for the rest of their vote to count. That’s the only reason why there is a second runoff.

Step 5: If the first runoff winner repeats as the second runoff winner, the first / second runoff winner is elected. Win two runoffs and you’re in.

Step 6: When the second runoff gives a different result, the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference have now lost. This result shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the first runoff. In the spirit of later-no-harm, winning the second runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the first runoff winner if they are better than the second runoff winner.

Step 7: To be fair, the third runoff gives the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference the chance for their lesser preferences to count in the same way as the first runoff’s runner-up in step 4. This application of fairness is the only reason why there is a third runoff.

Step 8: If the second runoff winner repeats as the third runoff winner, the second / third runoff winner is elected. Here, as in step 5, having the same result is enough. Win two runoffs and you’re in.

Step 9: When the third runoff gives a different result, it shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the second runoff. Here, as in step 6, winning the runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the second runoff winner if they are better than the third runoff winner.

Step 10: Completing the circle of comparisons, it is fair to elect the third runoff winner if they are also better than the first runoff winner.

Step 11: It’s a cyclical tie. It does not matter that a runoff winner has: the most approval; the biggest margin in winning its runoff; or the most votes in winning its runoff. Using those conditions to break a tie is an invitation to vote strategically. Shut that door. A tie is a tie. It must be settled by random draw.


Proof of concept

Here's a shared link to a spreadsheet demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows. Note: you need to be signed on to a Google Account). Includes use of Condorcet Loser criteria during elimination rounds (July 2024)

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UR7yJyN3XYszE0LYRe9J-RE1YbEdOHvuq1X2-LOaEac/edit#gid=664199959


As of April 2024 I've made an Excel workbook for Excel users (10 candidates, 1-5 picks and 50 voting rows): Currently does not make use of Condorcet Loser criteria.

https://onedrive.live.com/edit?id=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&resid=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&cid=7d93452d5e5af617&ithint=file%2Cxlsx&redeem=aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3gvYy83ZDkzNDUyZDVlNWFmNjE3L0VlR0tCZE9GXzVsTnE0MGRWMkdwZ01FQnZrZnRMUm9EdXNCMEhybVhzaFpaT1E_ZT0wS0NmRXI&migratedtospo=true&wdo=2


Examples comparing SV to IRV

This example shows a paradoxical tie. To be fair, SV gives each candidate an equal chance of election.

4 A>B

3 B>C

2 C>A

IRV elects A. SV decides who wins a three way tie (step 11).


The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze.

4 A>C

3 B>C

2 C

IRV elects A. SV elects Candidate C (step 8).


The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary.

4 A>C

3 B>C

2 C>B

IRV elects B. SV elects C (step 8). No need to turn 2 A>C into 2 C>A.


The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing monotonicity.

8 A

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV and SV elect B.


When 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal):

6 A

2 C

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV elects A. SV decides who wins the three way tie (step 11).


Using SV, the same result can be produced by simply having the 2 supporters of A add C to their ballots.

6 A

2 A>C

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV elects B. SV decides who wins in the three way tie (step 11).