User:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote
Standard Vote is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. This addition to IRV addresses the unfairness inherent in a single runoff voting system, by identifying when the runner-up has a spoiler effect on the election and doing something about it.
This method modifies Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with later-no-harm safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions improve on simple IRV by: making this system more monotonic (Monotonicity), reducing the failure rate for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), eliminating Spoilers, eliminating Center-squeeze, and making Favorite Betrayal much less tempting.
Plural Voting
IRV’s plural voting issue is about voters whose first choice is for the runner-up and because of that they never get the chance for their lesser choices to count like everyone else that loses. AirV fixes the plural voting problem by using multiple runoffs.
Greater fairness
Keeping the simple parts of IRV and adding greater fairness creates a better voting system. Popular and successful negative election campaign strategies used in IRV and First Past the Post will not work.
Additional runoffs
Because there will be one or two additional runoffs, this process must decide which runoff winner is better. In the spirit of later-no-harm, repeating runoff winners are elected (steps 5 and 8) and different winners will be compared one on one (in steps 6, 9 and 10). In the event of a tie, the earlier runoff winner will be considered better than a later winner.
Description
(website https://standardvote.wordpress.com/ )
Standard Vote (a.k.a. Anderson’s IRV or AirV) was “invented” by Ralph Anderson in 2023, with enhancements in 2024.
How it works
With 5 or more alternatives, voters have a limit of 5 choices that will be counted. With 4 alternatives, the limit is 4, With 3 alternatives the limit is 3. The system is not used for elections with only 2 alternatives.
An initial Random Voter Hierarchy (RVH) is used to order equally ranked choices within each level of preference. Then the ballot is used as a Ranked Choice Vote (RCV) for the runoffs ensuring one voter has one vote that counts in the runoffs.
The first runoff is a normal looking runoff. The Condorcet Loser criteria is applied in elimination rounds having more than three alternatives still counting. The voter’s highest choice still counting is tallied round by round. The elimination rounds repeat until there are two alternatives left. A tie for elimination is settled by using a scond RVH. The first runoff identifies a winner and a runner-up.
The second runoff begins by eliminating the first runoff’s runner-up. The voter’s highest choice still counting is tallied round by round. Eliminations continue until an alternative wins the runoff by having a majority of the votes still counting. The Condorcet Loser Criteria is applied as in the first runoff. A tie for elimination is again settled by using the second RVH. This second runoff addresses the unfairness of plural voting.
If the same alternative wins both runoffs, that alternative is elected.
When different alternatives win, they are compared one on one. Equal ranked preferences count for both. If the first winner does not lose to the second winner, then the first winner is elected.
If no one has been elected, the third runoff begins by eliminating the first runoff’s winner. The voter’s highest choice still counting is tallied round by round. Eliminations continue until an alternative wins the runoff by having a majority of the votes still counting. The Condorcet Loser Criteria is applied as in the first and second runoffs. A tie for elimination is again settled by using the second RVH.
If the same alternative wins the second and third runoffs, they are elected.
When different alternatives win, they are compared one on one. Equal ranked preferences count for both. If the second winner does not lose to the third winner, then the second winner is elected.
With three different winners, the first winner is compared to the third winner one on one. Equal ranked preferences count for both. If the third winner beats the first winner, then the third winner is elected.
With no one elected, identify if there is a Condorcet Winner and elect that alternative.
Finally, with no one elected, the result is a Condorcet Paradox. Use a third RVH to elect the alternative with the lowest rank.
When using NOTA as an alternative, it gets the worst value in the first and second RVHs, and the best value in the third RVH.
An example of fair
8 votes for A
4 votes for A > C
8 votes for B > D > A
6 votes for C > B > D
First Past The Post and Approval Voting would elect A.
IRV and STAR Voting would elect B.
Standard Vote elects C.
The straight forward instant process:
There is no equal ranking of choices, so the ballots are already in RCV format.
In the first runoff, D is eliminated followed by C. The winner is B and the runner-up is A.
In the second runoff, A is eliminated right away. This gives the runner-up’s down ballot support for other alternatives a chance to be counted. When D is eliminated, C wins the second runoff.
The winners are different, so B is compared to C, one on one. B (8) loses to C (10).
In the third runoff, B is eliminated right away. This gives the down ballot choices for supporters of B to go to other alternatives. It’s the same fairness that was given to A’s supporters in the second runoff. C is eliminated next and D wins the third runoff.
When the second and third runoff winners are different, C is compared to D, one on one.
C is elected because C (10) does not lose to D (8).
Having elected an alternative, the remaining process is abandoned.
Had the process continued, the third runoff winner would be compared to the first runoff winner one on one. This would complete the search for and the election of a Condorcet Winner from within the set of three winners. Failing that, the process looks for and would elect the Condorcet Winner if it exists from within all the alternatives. And finally with still no one elected, the three runoff winners would find themselves in a Condorcet Paradox, and one of them would be elected using the third RVH.
In this example, Standard Vote elects C with the help of down ballot support coming from A. Since alternative A had already lost to B in the first runoff and did not win in the third runoff, these votes do later-no-harm by electing C.
It should be noted that this was a very clean looking election with no complications involving Condorcet Losers or tie breaking during runoff eliminations.
To Demonstrate
Google Sheets spreadsheets are available to demonstrate the instant process. Links to a cell phone version for 200 votes:
and a larger full reporting version: