User:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote
Due to somebody already using something called Standard Vote. As of August 24,2024, this voting system is now called Anderson's IRV (AirV). It does IRV first (2 or 3 times) and pairwise comparisons second (only between runoff winners).
AirV is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. This addition to IRV addresses the unfairness inherent in a single runoff voting system, by identifying when the runner-up has a spoiler effect on the election and doing something about it.
This method modifies Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with later-no-harm safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions improve on simple IRV by: making this system more monotonic (Monotonicity), reducing the failure rate for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), eliminating Center-squeeze, and making the practice of Favorite Betrayal unnecessary.
Plural Voting: IRV’s plural voting issue is why I made AirV. That issue is about voters whose first choice is for the runner-up and because of that they never get the chance for their lesser choices to count like everyone else that loses. It appears that some voters who lose get two or more votes and some get only one. It’s not fair to voters. It is also unfair to candidates who never get those votes. AirV fixes the plural voting problem by using multiple runoffs.
A better ballot: Voters cast a more full and more honest opinion than IRV by allowing a voter the opportunity to indicate two or more candidates are tied. AirV keeps IRV’s principle of later no harm by ensuring a voter’s lesser preference never causes their more preferred preference to lose. By giving voters up to five choices on a ballot, voters don’t have to guess which one candidate has a chance to beat the one candidate they don’t want.
Greater fairness: Keeping the simple parts of IRV and adding greater fairness creates a better voting system. Popular and successful negative election campaign strategies used in IRV and First Past the Post will not work. Standard Vote fixes the spoiler effect, center squeeze and voter betrayal. A candidate trying to win is left with only one campaign strategy for success. That’s to promote themselves as better than everybody else. That is all voters have ever wanted candidates to do.
Additional runoffs: Because there will be one or two additional runoffs, this process must decide which runoff winner is better. In the spirit of later-no-harm, repeating runoff winners are elected (steps 5 and 8) and different winners will be compared one on one (in steps 6, 9 and 10). In the event of a tie, the earlier runoff winner will be considered better than a later winner.
Description (as of August 2024, I have a website, https://standardvote.wordpress.com/ )
The Google Sheets demonstrator now has a B4vote sheet to put in some election specific info like a topic, short names of alternatives, and choosing to use "None of the Above". For comparing AirV results to those of other runoff systems, the B4vote sheet includes switches to turn on/off the use of "instant" random voter hierarchy, Condorcet Loser and Condorcet criteria within the process. Five levels of ranking makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.
After ballots are collected and recorded, AirV "instantly" uses up to twelve steps needed to find the best and fairest result. These are described on the website and in the spreadsheets.
Proof of concept
Here's a shared link to a spreadsheet demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows. Note: you need to have a Google Account. it's free). Includes use of Condorcet Loser criteria during elimination rounds (July 2024). Includes an additional step to elect the Condorcet winner in extraordinary circumstances (September 5, 2024). The Google Sheets Demonstrator has been expanded on Sept 27th 2024, to allow up to 1000 voting rows. The 2009 Burlington Mayoral election data (383 rows obtained from electowiki/elections/IRV elections) is included in the Examples. Added the option to use binding NOTA (October 2,2024). Finally, and I know I'm done, I added an unspoilable ballot, and instant random tiebreaking to the demonstration spreadsheet (October 29,2024).
As of April 2024 I've made an Excel workbook for Excel users (10 candidates, 1-5 picks and 50 voting rows. Note: you need to have a Microsoft 365 Account. It's free). As of July 25, 2024, includes the Condorcet Loser criteria in runoff elimination rounds. As of September 5, 2024, includes the Condorcet Winner criteria in rule 11. Finally, and I know I'm done, I added an unspoilable ballot sample, instant random tiebreaking and NOTA to this demonstrator on October 29th, 2024.
As of December 3, 2024, I have made a Google Sheets spreadsheet for cell phones, requires the voter to copy the ballot from the D sheet into an open row on the e sheet using special pasting of values only,
Examples comparing AirV to IRV
This example shows a paradoxical tie. To be fair, AirV gives each candidate an equal chance of election.
4 A>B
3 B>C
2 C>A
IRV elects A. AirV decides who wins a three way tie (step 11).
The next example shows how Anderson's IRV does not suffer from center-squeeze.
4 A>C
3 B>C
2 C
IRV elects A. AirV elects Candidate C (step 8).
The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary.
4 A>C
3 B>C
2 C>B
IRV elects B. AirV elects C (step 8). No need to turn 2 A>C into 2 C>A.
The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing monotonicity.
8 A
5 B>A
4 C>B
IRV and AirV elect B.
When 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal):
6 A
2 C
5 B>A
4 C>B
IRV elects A. AirV decides who wins the three way tie (step 11).
Using AirV, the same result can be produced by simply having the 2 supporters of A add C to their ballots.
6 A
2 A>C
5 B>A
4 C>B
IRV elects B. AirV decides who wins in the three way tie (step 11). the final example shows that the Condorcet Winner can lose:
The final example shows that the Condorcet Winner can lose:
1 A>D
1 B>D
1 C>D
D is the Condorcet Winner. There are 24 possible runoff variations depending on the tiebreaking between candidates.
D wins 18 of them. A, B and C win two each. All part of ensuring later-no-harm to each voter's most preferred choice.