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Proposed Statutory Rules for the Schulze Method: Difference between revisions
Proposed Statutory Rules for the Schulze Method (view source)
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This page is intended to specify the proposed statutory rules for the [[Schulze method]] in a form suitable for use by legislatures or in referenda or initiatives. The properties, criteria satisfied and motivations for the [[Schulze method]] should be discussed elsewhere.
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=== Article 1 ===
Each ballot contains a complete list of all qualified candidates. Furthermore, each voter may write in [''number of write-in options''] additional candidates. Each voter ranks these candidates in order of preference. The individual voter may give the same preference to more than one candidate and he may keep candidates unranked. When a given voter does not rank all candidates, then it is presumed that this voter strictly prefers all ranked candidates to all not ranked candidates and that this voter is indifferent between all not ranked candidates.
=== Article 2 ===
#A ''majority winner'' is a candidate such that on a majority of the valid ballots this candidate is strictly preferred to every other candidate. If there is a majority winner, then this candidate wins the elections.
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:::If there is only one hopeful candidate, then this hopeful candidate is the final winner. If there is more than one hopeful candidate, then (a) all hopeful candidates are tied for winner and (b) the final winner is chosen from the hopeful candidates as prescribed by law for cases where there is a tie for winner.
==
=== Article 1 ===
Each ballot contains a complete list of all qualified candidates. Furthermore, each voter may write in [''number of write-in options''] additional candidates. Each voter ranks these candidates in order of preference. The individual voter may give the same preference to more than one candidate and he may keep candidates unranked. When a given voter does not rank all candidates, then it is presumed that this voter strictly prefers all ranked candidates to all not ranked candidates and that this voter is indifferent between all not ranked candidates.
=== Article 2 ===
#A ''majority winner'' is a candidate such that on a majority of the valid ballots this candidate is strictly preferred to every other candidate. If there is a majority winner, then this candidate wins the elections.
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::If there is only one potential winner, then this potential winner is the final winner. If there is more than one potential winner, then (a) all potential winners are tied for winner and (b) the final winner is chosen from the potential winners as prescribed by law for cases where there is a tie for winner.
== Alternative #3 ==
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