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SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions
SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval) (view source)
Revision as of 04:30, 23 June 2011
, 13 years ago→Technical discussion
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== Technical discussion ==
How can spoilers still be possible under SODA if the CW has a known, strong equilibrium in their favor? Because it is not necessarily unique. Imagine two, similar candidates in a natural majority coalition, running against one slightly-minority candidate. One of the two majority candidates is almost certain to be the CW, but if the other similar candidate can make a credible threat to withold aproval, and the CW would rather cede to this blackmail than see the minority candidate win, then the non-CW also has a (smaller) strong equilibrium in their favor.
This situation could only arise if the second candidate could "win the game of chicken", convincing the CW to extend delegated approval to them. Since the CW has the natural advantage in this game, the non-CW could only prevail if they were known not to care very much about who won if they didn't. If voters knew this about them, then their own voters could choose to explicitly approve the CW. Thus, on the whole, it is likely that SODA would get the "right" result even in this case.
(Note that all other single-round single-winner systems suffer either from some spoiler problem or from some converse problem of teaming, which is usually worse.)
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]]
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