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Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions
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Symmetrical ICT, like ordinary ICT, automatically avoids the chicken dilemma. Here is a criterion that measures for that property:
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'''The Chicken Dilemma Criterion:'''
The Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD):
Supporting definitions:
1. The A voters are the voters who prefer candidate A to every other
candidate. The B voters are the voters who prefer candidate B to every
other candidate.
2. The "other candidates" are the candidates other than A and B.
3. A particular voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a
preference, or fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting
system in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the
preferences that s/he actually votes.
Premise:
1. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
of the voters in the election.
2. The A voters and the B voters all prefer both A and B to the other
candidates.
3. The A voters are more numerous than are the B voters.
4. Voting is sincere, except that the B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
5. Candidate A would be the unique winner under sincere voting (...in
other words, if the B voters voted sincerely, as do all the other
voters).
Requirement:
B doesn't win.
[end of CD definition]
'''A few improved properties of ICT and Symmetrical ICT:'''
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I already mentioned that ICT and Symmetrical ICT meet FBC. That's the main, most important, difference between Symmetrical ICT and traditional, unimproved Condorcet.
But, additionally, ICT and Symmetrical ICT, automatically avoid the chicken dilemma. They meet CD, the Chicken Dilemma Criterion.
Another advantage of Symmetrical ICT:
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