Summed-Ranks: Difference between revisions
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== Analysis == |
== Analysis == |
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SR meets criteria not met by other Borda versions. These are listed |
SR meets criteria not met by other Borda versions. These are listed below, with comments: |
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=== The |
=== The [[favorite betrayal criterion]] === |
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A ballot votes a candidate at top if it votes that candidate over someone, and doesn't vote anyone over that candidate. |
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⚫ | SR passes the [[favorite betrayal criterion]]. Because of of SR's FBC compliance, SR gives no incentive or need for [[tactical voting|compromise strategy]] beyond compromising-compression. There's never a reason to not rank one's favorite in 1st place, along with whatever compromise(s) one wishes to also rank there. |
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Moving a candidate to top on a ballot shouldn't change the winner from a candidate then voted at top on that ballot to a candidate not then voted at top on that ballot |
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[end of Favorite-Betrayal Criterion definition] |
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Favorite-Betrayal Criterion is abbreviated "FBC". |
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FBC is important because "favorite-burial", voting other candidates over one's favorite, drastically distorts public wishes and preferences, with obvious seriously adverse societal results. |
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=== [[Later-No-Help]] === |
=== [[Later-No-Help]] === |
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If some candidates have been voted-for on a ballot, then causing the winner to be one of those already voted-for should never require voting for additional candidates on that ballot. |
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To vote for a candidate is to vote that candidate over someone. |
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[end of Later-No-Help definition] |
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Later-No-Help is abbreviated "LNHe". |
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=== Others === |
=== Others === |
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SR's other criterion-compliances are similar to those of other Borda versions. For example, SR passes Participation and [[Consistency]], and fails Independence |
SR's other criterion-compliances are similar to those of other Borda versions. For example, SR passes [[Participation criterion|Participation]] and [[Consistency]], and fails [[Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]] and [[clone independence|Clone Independence]]. |
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In addition to Participation, SR passes Participation's more-easily-passed variations: |
In addition to Participation, SR passes Participation's more-easily-passed variations: |
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Mono-Add-Top |
==== Mono-Add-Top ==== |
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== Comments == |
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Instant Runoff, Majority-Judgment, and all Condorcet versions, fail Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. |
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Summed-Ranks (SR) is a relatively new proposal, and likely hasn't been used. |
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SR greatly alleviates the typical Borda clone problem. In ordinary Borda, it's advantageous for a faction or party to nominate many identical candidates. Even when the alternatives-set is fixed, sets of very similar alternatives are favored. |
SR greatly alleviates the typical Borda clone problem. In ordinary Borda, it's advantageous for a faction or party to nominate many identical candidates. Even when the alternatives-set is fixed, sets of very similar alternatives are favored. |
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SR is for when it's desired to give voters the simple instruction to mark 1st choice(s), 2nd choice(s), etc., instead of asking them to rate the candidates or alternatives, and the number of alternatives is prohibitively large for a Condorcet hand count, and a Condorcet-programmed computer isn't available to do the count. |
SR is for when it's desired to give voters the simple instruction to mark 1st choice(s), 2nd choice(s), etc., instead of asking them to rate the candidates or alternatives, and the number of alternatives is prohibitively large for a Condorcet hand count, and a Condorcet-programmed computer isn't available to do the count. |
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It has been argued that a hand count is the only secure count, for official public elections. |
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SR's uniquely simple definition and count rule are also an acceptance-advantage over other rank methods. |
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[[Category:Ranked voting methods]] |
[[Category:Ranked voting methods]] |
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[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]] |
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]] |