Support Accept Reject Abstain voting: Difference between revisions

From electowiki
Content added Content deleted
imported>Homunq
(blurb for each step)
imported>Homunq
No edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to [[Majority Acceptable Score voting]], which is the [[graded Bucklin]] method which uses [[3 grade levels]] and breaks median ties using [[Score voting]]. SARA works as follows:
Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to [[Majority Acceptable Score voting]], which is the [[graded Bucklin]] method which uses [[3 grade levels]] and breaks median ties using [[Score voting]]. SARA works as follows:


# Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. These are worth 2, 1, 0, and 0 points, respectively. Default is abstain.
# '''Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. These are worth 2, 1, 0, and 0 points, respectively. Default is abstain.'''
#*''You should always support your favorite(s) and reject anyone who's worse than what you expect from the election. As for those in between, you should probably accept them if you think your favorite(s) will be rejected by a majority, and abstain otherwise.''
#*''You should always support your favorite(s) and reject anyone who's worse than what you expect from the election. As for those in between, you should probably accept them if you think your favorite(s) will be rejected by a majority, and abstain otherwise.''
# Eliminate any candidates averaging under half a vote per voter, unless that leaves none.
# '''Eliminate any candidates averaging under half a vote per voter, unless that leaves none.'''
#* ''This eliminates lesser-known candidates so that the next step won't elect one of them by mistake.''
#* ''This eliminates lesser-known candidates so that the next step won't elect one of them by mistake.''
# Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves none.
# '''Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves none.'''
#* ''If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a majority.''
#* ''If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a majority.''
# Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.
# '''Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.'''
#* ''This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.''
#* ''This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.''



Revision as of 00:21, 23 October 2016

Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to Majority Acceptable Score voting, which is the graded Bucklin method which uses 3 grade levels and breaks median ties using Score voting. SARA works as follows:

  1. Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. These are worth 2, 1, 0, and 0 points, respectively. Default is abstain.
    • You should always support your favorite(s) and reject anyone who's worse than what you expect from the election. As for those in between, you should probably accept them if you think your favorite(s) will be rejected by a majority, and abstain otherwise.
  2. Eliminate any candidates averaging under half a vote per voter, unless that leaves none.
    • This eliminates lesser-known candidates so that the next step won't elect one of them by mistake.
  3. Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves none.
    • If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a majority.
  4. Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.
    • This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.

As the first round of a two-round system ("SARA with runoff")

If this system is used as the first round of a two-round runoff, then you want to use it to elect at two finalists in the first round. Thus, run the system twice. The first time, replace "50%" in step 3 with "2/3".

Then, to find the second winner, if the first-time winner got 1/3 or more support, first downweight those ballots as if you'd eliminated enough of them to make up 1/3 of the electorate. Otherwise, discard all of the ballots which supported first-time winner. After downweighting or discarding, run MAS normally.

If all the candidates in the first round got a majority of 0's, then you can still find two finalists as explained above. But the voters have sent a message that none of the candidates are good, so one way to deal with the situation would be to have a rule to allow candidates to transfer their 2-votes to new candidates who were not running in the first round, and if those transfers would have made the new candidates finalists, then add them to the second round along with the two finalists who did best in the first round. In that case, since there would be more than 2 candidates in the second round, it would be important to use MAS for the second round too.

Relationship to NOTA

As discussed in the above section, if all the candidates in the first round got a majority "reject", then the voters have sent a message that none of the candidates are good, akin to a result of "none of the above" (NOTA). MAS still gives a winner, but it might be good to have a rule that such a winner could only serve one term, or perhaps a softer rule that if they run for the same office again, the information of what percent of voters rejected them should be next to their name on the ballot

An example

Tennessee's four cities are spread throughout the state
Tennessee's four cities are spread throughout the state

Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities, and that everyone wants to live as near the capital as possible.

The candidates for the capital are:

  • Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities
  • Nashville, with 26% of the voters, near the center of Tennessee
  • Knoxville, with 17% of the voters
  • Chattanooga, with 15% of the voters

The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:

42% of voters
(close to Memphis)
26% of voters
(close to Nashville)
15% of voters
(close to Chattanooga)
17% of voters
(close to Knoxville)
  1. Memphis
  2. Nashville
  3. Chattanooga
  4. Knoxville
  1. Nashville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Knoxville
  4. Memphis
  1. Chattanooga
  2. Knoxville
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis
  1. Knoxville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis

Assume voters in each city give their own city 2; any city within 100 miles, 1; any city between 100 and 200 miles, a blank; and any city that is over 200 miles away or is the farthest city, 0. (These assumptions can be varied substantially without changing the result, but they seem reasonable to start with.)

City Support Accept Reject
<50
Abstain score
>50
Memphis 42 0 58 0 (84)
Nashville 26 0 0 74 52
Chattanooga 15 17 42 26 47
Knoxville 17 15 42 26 49

Memphis is explicitly given 0 by a majority, and is eliminated. Chattanooga and Knoxville are both given 0 by a majority implicitly, so they are eliminated. Nashville remains and wins.

If Memphis voters tried to strategize by rating Nashville at 0 in the above scenario, Chattanooga and Knoxville voters could protect against this strategy if 2/3 of them gave Nashville a 1.