Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
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=== Predisposition to sincerity === |
=== Predisposition to sincerity === |
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Some experiments have found that voters tend to behave sincerely more often than the instrumentally rational model indicates. In an experiment designed to have a low barrier to sophisticated voting, Herzberg and Wilson found that only 20%-40% of the voters made use of the opportunity; the rest voted sincerely.<ref name="Herzberg Wilson 1988 pp. 471–486">{{cite journal | last=Herzberg | first=Roberta Q. | last2=Wilson | first2=Rick K. | title=Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting | journal=The Journal of Politics | publisher= |
Some experiments have found that voters tend to behave sincerely more often than the instrumentally rational model indicates. In an experiment designed to have a low barrier to sophisticated voting, Herzberg and Wilson found that only 20%-40% of the voters made use of the opportunity; the rest voted sincerely.<ref name="Herzberg Wilson 1988 pp. 471–486">{{cite journal | last=Herzberg | first=Roberta Q. | last2=Wilson | first2=Rick K. | title=Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting | journal=The Journal of Politics | publisher=University of Chicago Press, Southern Political Science Association | volume=50 | issue=2 | year=1988 | issn=00223816 | jstor=2131804 | pages=471–486 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131804 | access-date=2021-12-06}}</ref> |
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Blais and Nadeau use a two-step analysis procedure to argue that 30% of the voters who would have benefited from strategic voting in the 1988 Canadian election actually did vote strategically.<ref name="Blais Nadeau 1996 pp. 39–52">{{cite journal | last=Blais | first=André | last2=Nadeau | first2=Richard | title=Measuring strategic voting: A two-step procedure | journal=Electoral Studies | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=15 | issue=1 | year=1996 | issn=0261-3794 | doi=10.1016/0261-3794(94)00014-x | pages=39–52}}</ref> They furthermore reason that tactical voting is more prevalent if the voters have only a weak intensity of preference for their first choice over their second, or if the election is a close race between their second and third choice. |
Blais and Nadeau use a two-step analysis procedure to argue that 30% of the voters who would have benefited from strategic voting in the 1988 Canadian election actually did vote strategically.<ref name="Blais Nadeau 1996 pp. 39–52">{{cite journal | last=Blais | first=André | last2=Nadeau | first2=Richard | title=Measuring strategic voting: A two-step procedure | journal=Electoral Studies | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=15 | issue=1 | year=1996 | issn=0261-3794 | doi=10.1016/0261-3794(94)00014-x | pages=39–52}}</ref> They furthermore reason that tactical voting is more prevalent if the voters have only a weak intensity of preference for their first choice over their second, or if the election is a close race between their second and third choice. |
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Due to the especially deep impact of tactical voting in [[first past the post]] electoral systems, some argue that systems with three or more strong or persistent parties become in effect forms of [[disapproval voting]], where the expression of disapproval, to keep an opponent out of office overwhelms the expression of approval, to approve a desirable candidate. [[Ralph Nader]] refers to this as the "least worst" choice, and argues that the similarity of parties and the candidates grows stronger due to the need to avoid this disapproval. |
Due to the especially deep impact of tactical voting in [[first past the post]] electoral systems, some argue that systems with three or more strong or persistent parties become in effect forms of [[disapproval voting]], where the expression of disapproval, to keep an opponent out of office overwhelms the expression of approval, to approve a desirable candidate. [[Ralph Nader]] refers to this as the "least worst" choice, and argues that the similarity of parties and the candidates grows stronger due to the need to avoid this disapproval. |
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Sirin Botan et al. showed that every Condorcet method of a particular type sometimes incentivizes the creation of Condorcet cycles when there's a sincere [[Condorcet winner]]. The types covered are Condorcet methods that only use pairwise defeat information and don't always tie when there's no Condorcet winner. <ref name="Botan Endriss 2021 pp. 5202–5210">{{cite journal | last=Botan | first=Sirin | last2=Endriss | first2=Ulle | title=Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation | journal=Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence | publisher=Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) | volume=35 | issue=6 | date=2021-05-18 | issn=2374-3468 | doi=10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16657 | pages=5202–5210}}</ref> |
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There are arguments about the best voting strategy to take in different systems, but the general consensus is: |
There are arguments about the best voting strategy to take in different systems, but the general consensus is: |