Talk:Dominant mutual third set: Difference between revisions
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[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 00:48, 19 December 2023 (UTC)
: While C is no longer a Condorcet winner after this modification, he is still a member of the Smith set, and the Smith set is a subset of the DMT set. Thus a Condorcet method that passes Smith (and thus DMT) could elect C both before and after, thus giving no incentive to use that strategy. (Also note that when there is a Condorcet winner, he is always part of the DMT set.) For instance, [[Schulze]], which passes Smith, elects C after truncation: see [https://munsterhjelm.no/km/rbvote/calc.html Rob LeGrand's ranked-ballot voting calculator].
: More broadly speaking, Condorcet is incompatible with [[later-no-help]] and [[later-no-harm]]. So you can't pass Condorcet and never have situations where truncation pays off. But that's not related to the DMT set as such - IRV itself passes both later-no-help and later-no-harm and elects from the DMT set. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 13:16, 20 December 2023 (UTC)
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