Talk:Instant-runoff voting: Difference between revisions

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: A simpler way to improve IRV is already explained at [[Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination]]. --[[User:VoteFair|VoteFair]] ([[User talk:VoteFair|talk]]) 23:46, 4 December 2023 (UTC)

I'm happy that Nashville wins. When given the Condorcet paradox, please confirm that RCIPE elects A.

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This lends itself to strategic campaigning where the leading candidate ensures the least preferred candidate finishes second. That’s IRV’s problem and RCIPE campaigns will do the same thing. Then it’s favorite betrayal time, where the supporters of B>C will have to decide if they need to change to C>B. That’s unfair to the B and C voters and very convenient for candidate A. [[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 01:24, 5 December 2023 (UTC)

: Every vote-counting method has specific cases where the method elects the "wrong" winner. What's more important is '''how often''' these specific "unfair" results occur.

: I don't know what your method does because it's not available on a non-Google URL, but 11 steps is '''way''' too complex for voters to understand. And it certainly fails the IIA criterion sometimes because all method fail it.

: Here's a plot that shows some calculations for how often RCIPE and other methods fail the IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) criterion, along with clone independence failures which are a special kind of IIA failure:

: http://www.votefair.org/clone_iia_success_rates.png

: --[[User:VoteFair|VoteFair]] ([[User talk:VoteFair|talk]]) 22:54, 5 December 2023 (UTC)