Talk:Sequentially Spent Score: Difference between revisions
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1. No deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that assigns each winner one equally weighted seat passes the favorite betrayal criteria because of free riding. While it may be theoretically possible for a proportional voting method of this type to pass FBC if you allow individual candidates to win more then one seat, there has yet to be a non deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that does so so if you want to assert that your method does do this you need to back it up with proof. |
1. No deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that assigns each winner one equally weighted seat passes the favorite betrayal criteria because of free riding. While it may be theoretically possible for a proportional voting method of this type to pass FBC if you allow individual candidates to win more then one seat, there has yet to be a non deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that does so so if you want to assert that your method does do this you need to back it up with proof. |
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2. Different versions of proportional approval are the only non-deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting methods that pass the consistency criterion. I've proved this on my own using hand-drawn ternary plots but I've also seen a an academic paper proving something similar to this (I'll have to find the paper). I might be wrong but this is also a big claim that needs to be proved to be accepted. |
2. Different versions of proportional approval voting are the only non-deterministic non-delegative party agnostic approval ballot proportional voting methods that pass the consistency criterion. I've proved this on my own using hand-drawn ternary plots but I've also seen a an academic paper proving something similar to this (I'll have to find the paper). I might be wrong but this is also a big claim that needs to be proved to be accepted. |
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3. I'm not sure if this criteria continues to be desirable in multi winner elections, though if it is, you again have not provided any proof that your method passes it. |
3. I'm not sure if this criteria continues to be desirable in multi winner elections, though if it is, you again have not provided any proof that your method passes it. |