Talk:Sequentially Spent Score

There are many problems with your criteria table.

1. No deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that assigns each winner one equally weighted seat passes the favorite betrayal criteria because of free riding. While it may be theoretically possible for a proportional voting method of this type to pass FBC if you allow individual candidates to win more then one seat, there has yet to be a non deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that does so so if you want to assert that your method does do this you need to back it up with proof.

2. Different versions of proportional approval voting are the only non-deterministic non-delegative party agnostic approval ballot proportional voting methods that pass the consistency criterion. I've proved this on my own using hand-drawn ternary plots but I've also seen a an academic paper proving something similar to this (I'll have to find the paper). I might be wrong but this is also a big claim that needs to be proved to be accepted.

3. I'm not sure if this criteria continues to be desirable in multi winner elections, though if it is, you again have not provided any proof that your method passes it.

4. As you said yourself, vote unitary isn't a criteria but a class of voting methods. It's not a criteria so we shouldn't treat it as one.

I apologize if I sound a bit harsh. I've also recently criticized these unsubstantiated assertions for another method (https://electowiki.org/wiki/Talk:Distributed_Score_Voting).

Perhaps you should wait to post a criteria table until I finish my automatic criteria checker (I'm going to reuse a lot of the code for the ternary plots I'm making to do that as well). ParkerFriedland (talk) 06:01, 10 February 2020 (UTC)

- Strictly speaking, it hasn't been proven that free riding is an unavoidable fact of any proportional method, just that the Droop proportionality criterion implies some degree of vulnerability to Hylland free riding. There could be other proportionality measures (e.g. ones that only hold for dichotomous ballots like Approval, or ones based on divisor methods or other quotas than Droop) that would pass FBC -- we don't know. Thus, while the extrapolation you do in your first point might well be true, you don't currently have the proof to do it.

- "Desirable" is a very subjective thing, and whether it's desirable for a method to pass or fail a criterion has no bearing on whether it actually does pass or fail that criterion. Since it's subjective, you should clarify what you mean by it, and back that up. If you mean e.g. "the method says it's proportional, but consistency (or whatever criterion) is incompatible with Droop proportionality and no other proportionality criterion has been given" then that's what you should say, because it says what is wrong.

- That said, I'm inclined to think that every criterion compliance statement should either be accompanied by a proof or a reference to a source that contains a proof. It's easy to think that a method "obviously" passes some criterion when it doesn't. Kristomun (talk) 12:38, 10 February 2020 (UTC)