Template:Infobox voting method: Difference between revisions
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (needs title parameter) |
||
Line 52: | Line 52: | ||
"description": "Does the Condorcet winner always win when they exist?", |
"description": "Does the Condorcet winner always win when they exist?", |
||
"type": "boolean" |
"type": "boolean" |
||
}, |
|||
"title": { |
|||
"description": "The name of the voting method", |
|||
"required": true |
|||
} |
} |
||
}, |
}, |
||
Line 65: | Line 69: | ||
"Favorite Betrayal criterion", |
"Favorite Betrayal criterion", |
||
"Single-winner reduction", |
"Single-winner reduction", |
||
"Party list case" |
"Party list case", |
||
"title" |
|||
] |
] |
||
} |
} |
Revision as of 00:32, 31 March 2020
No
An infobox for voting methods
Parameter | Description | Type | Status | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Utility criterion | Utility criterion | Does the candidate with the greatest utility always win? | Boolean | optional |
Majority criterion | Majority criterion | Does a candidate that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win? | Boolean | optional |
Mutual majority criterion | Mutual majority criterion | Does someone from a set of candidates that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win?
| Boolean | optional |
Condorcet criterion | condorcet | Does the Condorcet winner always win when they exist? | Boolean | optional |
Smith criterion | Smith criterion | Does a candidate from the Smith set always win? | Boolean | optional |
Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Does the same candidate always win when candidates not in the Smith set are added or removed from the election? | Boolean | optional |
Later-no-harm criterion | Later-no-harm criterion | Can a voter hurt one of their more-preferred candidates' chances of winning by indicating a preference for a less-preferred candidate? | Boolean | optional |
Favorite Betrayal criterion | Favorite Betrayal criterion | Do voters ever have strategic incentive to indicate they prefer someone who isn't their honest favorite more than their honest favorite? | Boolean | optional |
Single-winner reduction | Single-winner reduction | Which single-winner voting method does this voting method reduce to (become equivalent to) in the single-winner case?
| Page name | optional |
Party list case | Party list case | Which proportional allocation method does this voting method become equivalent to when voters vote on party lines? | Page name | optional |
title | title | The name of the voting method | Unknown | required |