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Total approval chain climbing: Difference between revisions
Removing TSCC section, since I copied it to User:MellowMoon/Total Score chain climbing
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(Removing TSCC section, since I copied it to User:MellowMoon/Total Score chain climbing) |
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'''Total approval chain climbing''' ('''TACC''') is a Condorcet [[completion method]] using an [[Approval ballot|approval]] component, invented by [[Forest Simmons]] in 2014.<ref>[[EM-list]] thread: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2014-April/thread.html#97913</ref> In the three-candidate case it is equivalent to electing the candidate in the cycle who defeats the approval loser pairwise. The motivation is to reduce [[burial]] incentive.
It works as follows:<blockquote>1. Sort the candidates by increasing total approval.
2. Starting with an empty "chain of candidates", consider each candidate in the above order. When the candidate defeats all candidates already in the chain, add her at the top of the chain. The last added candidate wins.</blockquote>Note that because of [[Condorcet cycle|Condorcet cycles]], it isn't always possible for one candidate to beat all others. Because of this, the procedure may stop before all candidates can be added to the chain.
== Example ==
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TACC is [[Smith-efficient]] because all members of the Smith set pairwise beat all candidates not in the Smith set, therefore once a Smith set member is added to the chain, a non-Smith set member can't be added to the chain, because they can't beat the Smith set member, and thus, can't beat everyone in the chain. Since this implies a Smith set member must be the last added candidate, only members of the Smith set can win.
== Variants ==
* TSCC: see [[User:MellowMoon/Total Score chain climbing]]▼
▲Total Score chain climbing
== References ==
<references/>
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
[[Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]]
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