User:Kristomun/Proposed voting methods
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This is a list of voting methods not separately described in articles on Electowiki but that have been proposed in academic articles or by election-methods members.
Condorcet-Approval hybrids
- RA*1, RA*2, RA*3, XA*1, XA*2,and XA*3.[1]
Condorcet methods
- Cup (w:Single-elimination tournament).[2]
- Moderated differential pairwise tallying.[3]
- Second order Copeland.[4]
Interactive methods
These methods require interaction by the candidates, e.g. asset voting and similar:
Matrix methods
These methods are given a number of candidates and positions, e.g. departments for members of cabinet, and asks voters to rank or rate each candidate for each position, returning one winner per position.
- The matrix vote.[7] (See also: Quota Borda system)
Nondeterministic methods
- GT method (Rivest-Shen).[8]
- Randomized Condorcet.[9]
- Randomized cup (single-elimination tournament with random seeding).[2]
Non-ranked/rated methods
These methods require voters to do more than just rank, grade, or rate the candidates.
- The Surprisingly Popular method (uses voter predictions of each other's votes to find expert minorities).[10]
- Aggregated SP and Partial SP. [11]
Participatory budgeting methods
- Knapsack voting.[12]
- Method of equal shares with bounded overspending (balancing proportionality and efficiency).[13]
- Minimal Transfers over Costs.[14]
- PB-Expanding Approvals Rule.[15]
Ranked methods
- Competition graph method.[16]
- Keener Eigenvector.[17]
- Minimum hillside violations.[18]
- Minimum hillside distance.[19]
- Offense-defense model.[20]
- Preferential approval voting.[21]
- Squared-Kemeny (proportional ordering).[22]
- Voting with Bidirectional Elimination.[23]
- Kemeny analog for simultaneous dominance over positional, pairwise, and relative rankings.[24]
Rated/graded methods
- Grama's Bucklin variants.[25]
Self-voting methods
In these methods, the voters are also the candidates. For instance: web pages ranking other pages in a search engine.
- PageRank and HITS.[26]
Multiwinner methods
These methods are generally proportional.
- At-large minmax and committee/noncommittee minmax (not proportional).[27]
- CIVS Condorcet PR.[28]
- CommitteeCore (core-stable under two restricted domains).[29]
- Divisor method-proportional generalized QPQ.[30]
- The Eneström-Phragmén method (approval STV).[31][32]
- The maximin support method (Approval voting D'Hondt extension).[33]
- p-Harmonic voting.[34]
- Phragmén's and Thiele's ordered (ordinal) methods.[35]
- Preferential party list STV method that treats each party as an infinite number of clones, and uses STV.[36]
- Redistributive Utilitarian Rule, and Generalized Conditional Utilitarian Rule (generalized CUT).[37]
- Sequential STV: first version,[38] second version,[39] third version.[40]
- Peters' and Skowron's Rule X (laminar-proportional priceable, PJR, EJR method).[41]
- Solid Coalition Refinement (house monotone Droop proportionality).[42]
- STV with elimination by electability scores (STV-EES).[43]
- STV with elimination of discounted contenders (STV-EDC).[44]
- STV with successive selection (STV-SS).[45]
- STV 4+ (an MMP method using STV).[46]
Proposed by EM members
- Double defeat, Hare (Chris Benham).[47]
- Maximal partial consensus, Nash lottery (Heitzig and Simmons).[48]
- Maxtree, Sinkhorn voting (Warren D. Smith).[49]
- Vote for a Published Ranking, VPR-MAM hybrid (Steve Eppley).[50][51]
Multiwinner methods
- Birational voting, LPV0+ (Forest Simmons, Warren D. Smith).[52]
- Harmonic voting, Psi voting (Warren D. Smith).[53][fn 1]
- Multiplicative sequential proportional approval/range voting, Ebert with optimum approval-removal (Warren D. Smith).[54]
- Schulze STV-MMP (Markus Schulze).[55]
- Warren's 0.495 apportionment method (Warren D. Smith).[56]
Footnotes
- ↑ In addition, Warren describes a broad class of "linear" voting methods that all pass a proportionality property.
References
- ↑ Potthoff, Richard F. (2011-08-31). "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections". Social Choice and Welfare. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 40 (1): 101–122. doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3. ISSN 0176-1714.
- ↑ a b Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas; Lang, Jérôme (2007). "When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?". Journal of the ACM. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 54 (3): 14. doi:10.1145/1236457.1236461. ISSN 0004-5411.
- ↑ Durham, Joseph W.; Lindener, Peter (2009). "Moderated Differential Pairwise Tallying: A Voter Specified Hybrid of Ranking by Pairwise Comparisons and Cardinal Utility Sums" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Bartholdi, J. J.; Tovey, C. A.; Trick, M. A. (1989). "The computational difficulty of manipulating an election" (PDF). Social Choice and Welfare. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 6 (3): 227–241. doi:10.1007/bf00295861. ISSN 0176-1714.
- ↑ Green-Armytage, James (2023-02-04). "A Dodgson-Hare synthesis". Constitutional Political Economy. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 34 (3): 458–470. doi:10.1007/s10602-023-09392-2. ISSN 1043-4062.
- ↑ Aziz, Haris; Lev, Omer; Mattei, Nicholas; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.; Walsh, Toby (2016-04-13). "Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment". arXiv:1604.03632.
- ↑ Emerson, Peter (2011). "The Matrix Vote: Electing an All-Party Coalition Cabinet" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Rivest, Ronald L.; Shen, Emily (2010-09-13). "An Optimal Single-Winner Preferential Voting System Based on Game Theory" (PDF). Proceedings Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice. Düsseldorf University Press.
- ↑ Hoang, Lê Nguyên (2017-02-13). "Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system". Social Choice and Welfare. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 48 (3): 679–701. doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1031-2. ISSN 0176-1714.
- ↑ Prelec, Dražen; Seung, H. Sebastian; McCoy, John (2017). "A solution to the single-question crowd wisdom problem" (PDF). Nature. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 541 (7638): 532–535. doi:10.1038/nature21054. ISSN 0028-0836.
- ↑ Hosseini, Hadi; Mandal, Debmalya; Puhan, Amrit (2024-06-02). "The Surprising Effectiveness of SP Voting with Partial Preferences". arXiv:2406.00870.
- ↑ Goel, Ashish; Krishnaswamy, Anilesh K.; Sakshuwong, Sukolsak; Aitamurto, Tanja (2019-05-31). "Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting". ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 7 (2): 1–27. doi:10.1145/3340230. ISSN 2167-8375.
- ↑ Papasotiropoulos, Georgios; Pishbin, Seyedeh Zeinab; Skibski, Oskar; Skowron, Piotr; Wąs, Tomasz (2024-09-23). "Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending". arXiv:2409.15005 [cs.GT].
- ↑ Skowron, Piotr; Slinko, Arkadii; Szufa, Stanisław; Talmon, Nimrod (2020-09-06). "Participatory Budgeting with Cumulative Votes". arXiv:2009.02690 [cs.MA].
- ↑ Aziz, Haris; Lee, Barton E. (2021-05-18). "Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 35 (6): 5110–5118. doi:10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16646. ISSN 2374-3468.
- ↑ Xiao, Yu; Deng, Hong-Zhong; Lu, Xin; Wu, Jun (2019-12-12). "Graph-based rank aggregation method for high-dimensional and partial rankings" (PDF). Journal of the Operational Research Society. Informa UK Limited. 72 (1): 227–236. doi:10.1080/01605682.2019.1657365. ISSN 0160-5682.
- ↑ Keener, James P. (1993). "The Perron–Frobenius Theorem and the Ranking of Football Teams" (PDF). SIAM Review. Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM). 35 (1): 80–93. doi:10.1137/1035004. ISSN 0036-1445.
- ↑ Pedings, Kathryn E.; Langville, Amy N.; Yamamoto, Yoshitsugu (2011-01-22). "A minimum violations ranking method" (PDF). Optimization and Engineering. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 13 (2): 349–370. doi:10.1007/s11081-011-9135-5. ISSN 1389-4420.
- ↑ Fallang, Marthe (2015). Ranking and Hillside Form (MSc thesis). University of Oslo.
- ↑ Govan, Anjela Y; Langville, Amy N; Meyer, Carl D (2009-01-15). "Offense-Defense Approach to Ranking Team Sports". Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports. Walter de Gruyter GmbH. 5 (1). doi:10.2202/1559-0410.1151. ISSN 1559-0410.
- ↑ Chapman, D. E. (2001). "Preferential Approval Voting". Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Lederer, Patrick; Peters, Dominik; Wąs, Tomasz. "The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings". arXiv:2404.08474 [cs.GT].
- ↑ Cook, Matthew S. (2011). Voting with Bidirectional Elimination. Stanford Digital Repository (Thesis). Retrieved 2024-04-08.
- ↑ Pérez-Fernández, Raúl; Alonso, Pedro; Díaz, Irene; Montes, Susana; De Baets, Bernard (2017). "Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties". International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. Elsevier BV. 91: 131–151. doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2017.09.004. ISSN 0888-613X.
- ↑ Grama, Gabriel-Claudiu (2021-10-13). "An algorithm for a fairer and better voting system". arXiv:2110.07066 [cs.AI].
- ↑ Ding, Chris; He, Xiaofeng; Husbands, Parry; Zha, Hongyuan; Simon, Horst D. (2002-08-11). PageRank, HITS and a unified framework for link analysis. New York, NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/564376.564440.
- ↑ Bubboloni, Daniela; Diss, Mostapha; Gori, Michele (2018). "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting". HAL-SHS. Retrieved 2024-10-10.
- ↑ Myers, Andrew. "Proportional Representation in CIVS". Condorcet Internet Voting Service. Retrieved 2024-10-15.
- ↑ Pierczyński, Grzegorz; Skowron, Piotr (2022). "Core-Stable Committees Under Restricted Domains". Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. p. 311–329. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_18. ISBN 978-3-031-22831-5. ISSN 0302-9743.
- ↑ Hyman, Ross (2011). "Divisor Method Proportional Representation in Preference-Ballot Elections" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Camps, Rosa; Mora, Xavier; Saumell, Laia (2019-07-23). "The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting". arXiv:1907.10590 [econ.TH].
- ↑ Brill, Markus; Freeman, Rupert; Janson, Svante; Lackner, Martin. "Phragmén's Voting Methods and Justified Representation". Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. Archived from the original on June 13, 2021. Retrieved 2020-02-04.
- ↑ Sánchez-Fernández, Luis; Fernández-García, Norberto; Fisteus, Jesús A.; Brill, Markus (2024). "The maximin support method: an extension of the D'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections". Mathematical Programming. 203 (1–2): 107–134. doi:10.1007/s10107-022-01805-8. ISSN 0025-5610.
- ↑ Gawron, Grzegorz; Faliszewski, Piotr (2022-02-07). "Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Movies". arXiv:2202.03385 [cs.GT].
- ↑ Janson, Svante (2016-11-27). "Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods". arXiv:1611.08826 [math.HO].
- ↑ Hill, I.D. (2011). "Party Lists and Preference Voting" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Suzuki, Mashbat; Vollen, Jeremy (2024-06-21). "Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting". arXiv:2406.14907 [cs.GT].
- ↑ Hill, I.D. (1994). "Sequential STV". Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Hill, I.D.; Gazeley, Simon (2002). "Sequential STV - a new version". Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Hill, I.D.; Gazeley, Simon (2005). "Sequential STV — a further modification" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Peters, Dominik; Skowron, Piotr (2020-07-13). Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism. ACM. p. 793–794. doi:10.1145/3391403.3399465. ISBN 978-1-4503-7975-5. Retrieved 2025-01-22.
- ↑ Aziz, Haris; Lederer, Patrick; Ritossa, Angus. "Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results". arXiv:2406.19689 [cs.GT].
- ↑ Gazeley, Simon (2000). "STV with Elimination by Electability Scores". Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Gazeley, Simon (2011). "STV with Elimination of Discounted Contenders" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Gazeley, Simon (1994). "STV with successive selection - An alternative to excluding the lowest". Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Bezzina, Frank; Buhagiar, Anton (2011). "STV 4+: A Proportional System for Malta's Electoral Process" (PDF). Voting matters. Retrieved 2024-10-04.
- ↑ Benham, Chris (2024-04-09). "Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections". Election-methods mailing list archives.
- ↑ Heitzig, Jobst; Simmons, Forest W. (2020-06-10). "Efficient democratic decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus". arXiv:2006.06548 [econ.GN].
- ↑ Smith, Warren D. (2007-06-12). "Descriptions of single-winner voting systems" (PDF). pp. 14–15. Retrieved 2023-10-09.
- ↑ Eppley, Steve (2020-01-17). "Schwarzenegger was Condorcet winner; VPR and Candidate Withdrawal to simplify voter strategy". Election-methods mailing list archives.
- ↑ Eppley, Steve (2024-10-13). "Request for proposed methods". Election-methods mailing list archives.
- ↑ Smith, Warren D. "Comparative survey of multiwinner election methods" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-10-07.
- ↑ Smith, Warren D. (1991-02-11). "Optimal proportional representation". RangeVoting.org. Retrieved 2023-10-09.
- ↑ "Optimal proportional representation, Holy grail??". RangeVoting.org. 2016-11-01. Retrieved 2024-10-05.
- ↑ Schulze, Markus (2008-08-04). "A New MMP Method (Part 2)" (PDF). Retrieved 2023-10-09.
- ↑ Smith, Warren D. "New Apportionment Method". RangeVoting.org. Retrieved 2023-10-09.