Venzke Bucklin Variant

VBV (for "Venzke Bucklin Variant") is a three-slot method defined by Kevin Venzke as an attempt to improve the Later-no-harm performance of MCA. See also IBIFA by Chris Benham, which could be seen as a similar attempt that doesn't sacrifice FBC or monotonicity.

Definition

1. The voter submits a three-slot ratings ballot (preferred, approved, and the default: disapproved).
2. Identify the candidate with the most top ratings (the "TRW").
3. Find the "tentative winner": the candidate who is preferred or approved on the greatest number of ballots, except don't count any "approved" votes from ballots that rate the TRW as preferred.
4. If the TRW and the tentative winner are the same candidate, elect that candidate.
5. Otherwise, elect the candidate who is preferred or approved on the greatest number of ballots. (The ballots preferring the TRW are not treated differently this time.)

Comments

The idea behind this method is that voters preferring the most-preferred candidate (the TRW) receive a privilege: They do not have their lower preference(s) counted unless the TRW is not going to win. This is a Later-no-harm-like guarantee that works similarly to IRV. All the other voters have their preferred and approved ratings counted equivalently, however.

The method sacrifices FBC and monotonicity basically because only one candidate's supporters can receive the privilege. It's possible that a candidate can win if they are the "tentative winner" given some other TRW, but not if they are the TRW themselves.