Vote For and Against: Difference between revisions
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m (Rename the criterion that the last preference of a majority can't be elected, the majority loser criterion) |
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== Properties == |
== Properties == |
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If we suppose ranked ballots are being used, then in the general case VFA satisfies the [[Monotonicity criterion]], and what could be called the ''Majority |
If we suppose ranked ballots are being used, then in the general case VFA satisfies the [[Monotonicity criterion]], and what could be called the ''Majority Loser criterion'' (i.e., the last preference of a majority cannot win). It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], Clone Independence, and the [[Participation criterion]]. |
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In the three-candidate case, VFA does satisfy the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and in one respect also Clone Independence: When the winner in a two-candidate race is ''cloned'', this cannot cause the loser of the two-candidate race to be elected. |
In the three-candidate case, VFA does satisfy the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and in one respect also Clone Independence: When the winner in a two-candidate race is ''cloned'', this cannot cause the loser of the two-candidate race to be elected. |