Woodall's method: Difference between revisions

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=== A few properties of Woodall ===
=== A few properties of Woodall ===
Woodall meets the Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC), and has no chicken
Woodall meets the [[mutual majority criterion]], and [[chicken dilemma criterion|has no chicken dilemma]]. Woodall meets the [[Condorcet criterion]], and the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]].
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Meeting Smith always implies meeting the [[mutual majority criterion]], and [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]] as well.
dilemma. Woodall meets the Condorcet Criterion (CC), and the Smith Criterion.
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Meeting Smith always implies meeting MMC, and Condorcet Loser as well.


Woodall doesn't meet [[FBC]]. FBC is necessary only under current conditions (dishonest, disinformational media, and an electorate who believe those media). Woodall isn't proposed for current conditions. Likewise for the similar methods proposed later at this page.
Woodall doesn't meet [[FBC]]. Like all Condorcet methods, Woodall fails Consistency, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. Woodall fails Mono-Raise, but passes Mono-Add-Plump and Mono-Append.

Consistency criteria: Woodall, like all Condorcet methods, fails Consistency, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. Woodall fails Mono-Raise, but passes Mono-Add-Plump and Mono-Append.


Woodall's importance comes from its unmatched freedom from strategy-need, made possible by MMC, freedom from chicken dilemma, and CC. Advantages such as that come at a price. The above-mentioned combination of properties appears to be incompatible with FBC and with Mono-Raise, Participation, Mono-Add-Top and Mono-Add-Unique top. Choice of a voting system always involves choice among properties.
Woodall's importance comes from its unmatched freedom from strategy-need, made possible by MMC, freedom from chicken dilemma, and CC. Advantages such as that come at a price. The above-mentioned combination of properties appears to be incompatible with FBC and with Mono-Raise, Participation, Mono-Add-Top and Mono-Add-Unique top. Choice of a voting system always involves choice among properties.


The consistency criteria don't have strategic importance.
The consistency criteria don't have strategic importance.
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Definition of MMC:
{{definition|A mutual majority (MM) is a set of voters comprising a majority of the voters, who all prefer some same set of candidates to all of the other candidates. That set of candidates is their MM-preferred set.
If a MM vote sincerely, then the winner should come from their MM-preferred set.
A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't vote an unfelt preference, or fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting system in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that she actually does vote.
To vote an unfelt preference is to vote X over Y if you prefer X to Y.
To vote an unfelt preference is to vote X over Y if you don't prefer X to Y.}}
===Consequences of Woodall's properties===
===Consequences of Woodall's properties===
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