Young's method is a Condorcet method that elects the candidate that can be made into a Condorcet winner by ignoring as few ballots as possible. It was devised by H. P. Young in 1977.
Peyton Young[edit | edit source]
Peyton Young (formal name: "Hobart Peyton Young") is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to evolutionary game theory and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the London School of Economics, James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Oxford, professorial fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Peyton Young was named a fellow of the Econometric Society in 1995, a fellow of the British Academy in 2007, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2018. He served as president of the Game Theory Society from 2006–08. He has published widely on learning in games, the evolution of social norms and institutions, cooperative game theory, bargaining and negotiation, taxation and cost allocation, political representation, voting procedures, and distributive justice.
Links[edit | edit source]
References[edit | edit source]
- Young, H. P. (1977-12-01). "Extending Condorcet's rule". Journal of Economic Theory. 16 (2): 335–353. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6. ISSN 0022-0531.
- Rothe, Jörg; Spakowski, Holger; Vogel, Jörg (2003-08-01). "Exact Complexity of the Winner Problem for Young Elections". Theory of Computing Systems. 36 (4): 375–386. doi:10.1007/s00224-002-1093-z. ISSN 1433-0490.
- Fishburn, Peter C. (1977-11-01). "Condorcet Social Choice Functions". SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics. 33 (3): 477–479. doi:10.1137/0133030. ISSN 0036-1399.
- The #Peyton Young section of this article was copied from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peyton_Young&oldid=965515042 on 2020-08-23