Method[edit | edit source]
- Determine the candidate with the most first preferences - the first preference winner - based on the submitted rankings.
- Edit the ballots so that all preferences below the first preference winner are removed/truncated.
- Check if the revised ballot set has a Condorcet winner. If so, elect that candidate.
- Otherwise elect the first preference winner.
Examples[edit | edit source]
25: A>B>D 20: B>C>D 20: C>D>A>B>E 18: D>C 17: E>D
The Condorcet winner is D, and is elected by instant-runoff voting. However, the adjusted CW is C, and is elected by Adjusted Condorcet Plurality.
25: A>E>B>C>D 21: B>D>C 20: C 19: D>C>A 15: E>C
The Condorcet winner is C, which IRV elects. But there is no adjusted Condorcet winner, so ACP defaults to the first preference winner, which is A.
Criterion compliances and implications[edit | edit source]
It is third-order summable: the summary contains the truncated Condorcet matrix for each candidate, as well as a count of first preferences for each candidate.
Like some other methods that are invulnerable to burial, it can be combined with a Condorcet stage to create strategy-resistant Condorcet methods by analogy to Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods. In contrast to the Smith-IRV methods, some of these, like Smith,ACP, would be summable.
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References[edit | edit source]
- Venzke, K. (2023-01-22). "Adjusted Condorcet Plurality, an interesting new LNHarm+LNHelp method". Election-methods mailing list archives.
- Venzke, K. (2023-01-26). "Adjusted Condorcet Plurality, an interesting new LNHarm+LNHelp method". Election-methods mailing list archives.