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Adjusted Condorcet Plurality (ACP) is a single-winner election method devised by Kevin Venzke in January 2023.[1] It passes both later-no-harm and later-no-help and thus has no burial incentive.

## Method

1. Determine the candidate with the most first preferences - the first preference winner - based on the submitted rankings.
2. Edit the ballots so that all preferences below the first preference winner are removed/truncated.
3. Check if the revised ballot set has a Condorcet winner. If so, elect that candidate.
4. Otherwise elect the first preference winner.

## Examples

25: A>B>D
20: B>C>D
20: C>D>A>B>E
18: D>C
17: E>D

The Condorcet winner is D, and is elected by instant-runoff voting. However, the adjusted CW is C, and is elected by Adjusted Condorcet Plurality.

25: A>E>B>C>D
21: B>D>C
20: C
19: D>C>A
15: E>C

The Condorcet winner is C, which IRV elects. But there is no adjusted Condorcet winner, so ACP defaults to the first preference winner, which is A.

## Criterion compliances and implications

Besides later-no-harm and later-no-help, Adjusted Condorcet Plurality passes the Plurality criterion.[2] It fails the Condorcet loser criterion, mono-add-top, and mono-raise.

It is third-order summable: the summary contains the truncated Condorcet matrix for each candidate, as well as a count of first preferences for each candidate.

Like some other methods that are invulnerable to burial, it can be combined with a Condorcet stage to create strategy-resistant Condorcet methods by analogy to Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods. In contrast to the Smith-IRV methods, some of these, like Smith,ACP, would be summable.