Approval with Optional Conditional votes: Difference between revisions
imported>Homunq (basic def) |
(Renamed Category:Approval methods to Category:Approval voting) |
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Approval with Optional Conditional-votes |
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A conditional approval isn't counted unless it is reciprocated. |
A conditional approval isn't counted unless it is reciprocated. |
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Sincere preferences: |
Sincere preferences: |
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* 27: A>B |
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* 24: B>A |
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* 49: C |
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49: C |
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The A voters should approve B, and the B voters should approve A. But what if the A voters |
The A voters should approve B, and the B voters should approve A. But what if the A voters |
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If you're an A voter, you'd be glad to hear that you can give a conditional approval to B, an |
If you're an A voter, you'd be glad to hear that you can give a conditional approval to B, an |
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approval that is conditional upon reciprocity. |
approval that is conditional upon reciprocity. |
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== See also == |
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* [[Reciprocal Score Voting]] |
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[[Category:Approval voting]] |
Latest revision as of 09:56, 16 August 2022
AOC conditionality can be described in terms of what it does for the voter.
A conditional approval isn't counted unless it is reciprocated.
It can be said in more detail, but a little more wordily:
Call a ballot's unconditionally-approved candidates its "favorites".
A ballot on which C is favorite is called a C-favorite ballot.
For each pair of candidates, C and D, the number of ballots on which D, but not C is favorite, and which conditionally approve C must at least equal the number on which C, but not D is favorite, and which conditionally approve D. Otherwise enough C-but-not-D-favorite ballots' conditional approvals of D are ignored to achieve the above-described parity condition.
But people will understand that, in examples like the one below, it's good if the voter can make an approval conditional upon reciprocity:
(If you haven't been on the list lately, you might not have seen this "Approval bad-example":
Sincere preferences:
- 27: A>B
- 24: B>A
- 49: C
The A voters should approve B, and the B voters should approve A. But what if the A voters approve B, and the B voters don't approve A? Then B will win, and the B voters will have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness and sincerity.
That's the co-operation/defection problem, or the chicken dilemma.
If you're an A voter, you'd be glad to hear that you can give a conditional approval to B, an approval that is conditional upon reciprocity.