Black's method: Difference between revisions
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(Spelling out the examples a lot better, and reperforming the math. I think I did this correctly. Also, I linked to w:Black's method over on English Wikipedia) |
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{{wikipedia|Black's method}} |
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⚫ | '''Black's method''' chooses the [[Condorcet winner]] if it exists, but uses the [[Borda count]] instead if there is an ambiguity |
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⚫ | '''Black's method''' chooses the [[Condorcet winner]] if it exists, but uses the [[Borda count]] instead if there is an ambiguity. This method is named for [[w:Duncan Black|Duncan Black]].<ref>{{Cite book| isbn = 978-94-009-4225-7| last = Black| first = Duncan| title = The Theory of Committees and Elections| accessdate = 2020-03-31| date = 1987| url = http://link.springer.com/openurl?genre=book&isbn=978-94-010-8375-1|publisher=|year=|location=|pages=66}}</ref> Note that the winner of the Borda count is not necessarily in the Smith set.<ref>{{Cite web| title = Is there formal proof that Duncan Black's Electoral System is a Condorcet System?| work = ResearchGate| accessdate = 2020-03-31| url = https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_there_formal_proof_that_Duncan_Blacks_Electoral_System_is_a_Condorcet_System|date=March 12, 2014|last=di Fenizio|first=Pietro Speroni|archive-url=|archive-date=|url-status=live}}</ref> |
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Example: |
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== Examples == |
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=== Example one === |
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Borda scores are A 185, B 205, C 210. A pairwise beats B beats C beats A, so there is no Condorcet winner (because everyone has at least one defeat). So the Borda winner, C, wins. |
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In this example, the candidates are ranked as follows: |
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==== Stage 1 of example one ==== |
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Note that the winner of the Borda count is not necessarily in the Smith set.<ref>{{Cite web| title = Is there formal proof that Duncan Black's Electoral System is a Condorcet System?| work = ResearchGate| accessdate = 2020-03-31| url = https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_there_formal_proof_that_Duncan_Blacks_Electoral_System_is_a_Condorcet_System|date=March 12, 2014|last=di Fenizio|first=Pietro Speroni|archive-url=|archive-date=|url-status=live}}</ref> For example, if there are 8 candidates and 3 voters, with ballots: |
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Evaluating these ballots pairwise, we see the following |
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A (1 win, 1 loss): defeats B (60 to 40) but loses to C (75 to 25) |
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B (1 win, 1 loss): defeats C (65 to 35) but loses to A (40 to 60) |
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C (1 win, 1 loss): defeats A (75 to 25) but loses to B (65 to 35) |
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Then A, B, and C form the Smith Set / Condorcet cycle (with 16 points each), while X is the Borda winner (with 18 points). |
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This demonstrates a Condorcet cycle (where A defeats B, B defeats C, and C defeats A), so we advance to the Borda stage. |
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==== Stage 2 of example 1 ==== |
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A [[Smith-efficient]] variant of Black's method could be used instead, to ensure someone in the [[Smith set]] will win. |
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The points allocated in the Borda stage can be expressed using [[ABIF]] in the following text: |
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25: A/2 > B/1 > C/0 |
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40: B/2 > C/1 > A/0 |
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35: C/2 > A/1 > B/0 |
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Counting up the Borda scores using the points above, we see: |
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A: ((25 * 2) + (35 * 1)) = 85 |
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B: ((40 * 2) + (25 * 1)) = 105 |
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C: ((35 * 2) + (40 * 1)) = 110 |
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C earns 110 points in the second round, so C is the winner. |
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=== Example two === |
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What follows is an example of Borda winner that is not in the Smith set, with 8 candidates ("A", "B", "C", "De", "Df", "Dg", "Dh", and "X") and 3 voters. The rankings are expressed below: |
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1: B > C > X > De > Df > Dg > Dh > A |
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1: C > A > X > De > Df > Dg > Dh > B |
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==== Stage 1 of example two ==== |
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A, B, and C form a Condorcet cycle. which can be seen by removing the candidates other than A, B, and C: |
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1: A > B > C |
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1: B > C > A |
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1: C > A > B |
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So the next stage is a Borda count. |
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==== Stage 2 of example two ==== |
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The points allocated in the Borda round are expressed using [[ABIF]] in the following text: |
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1: A/7 > B/6 > X/5 > De/4 > Df/3 > Dg/2 > Dh/1 > C/0 |
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1: B/7 > C/6 > X/5 > De/4 > Df/3 > Dg/2 > Dh/1 > A/0 |
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1: C/7 > A/6 > X/5 > De/4 > Df/3 > Dg/2 > Dh/1 > B/0 |
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This results in the following point allocations |
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* A receives 7+0+6 points (13 points) |
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* B receives 6+7+0 points (13 points) |
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* C receives 0+7+6 points (13 points) |
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* X receives 5+5+5 points (15 points) |
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This X wins the election in the Borda-based tiebreaker, even though X wasn't part of the Condorcet cycle in the first round. |
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== Similar methods== |
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A [[Smith-efficient]] Condorcet method could be used in the first stage (such as [[Copeland's method]]), where only the candidates that are tied using the first method advance to the second method. This would ensure that someone in the [[Smith set]] advances from round one, only resorting to a Borda-based tiebreaker when a [[Condorcet winner criterion|Condorcet winner]] doesn't defeat all other candidates pairwise. |
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<references /> |
<references /> |
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[[Category:Condorcet-Borda hybrid methods]] |
[[Category:Condorcet-Borda hybrid methods]] |