Bottom-Two-Runoff IRV: Difference between revisions

Add more accurate references and origin dates (something weird is up with my archive software, so the first link is to a .eml for now...)
(Suggesting renaming this from "Bottom-Two-Runoff IRV" to "Bottom-two-runoff-instant-runoff-voting method to give the article a name more likely to be accepted on English Wikipedia)
(Add more accurate references and origin dates (something weird is up with my archive software, so the first link is to a .eml for now...))
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The process: take the two options with the fewest first preference votes. The pairwise loser out of those two options is eliminated, and the next preferences from those ballots are redistributed. This process repeats until there is only one option remaining, and that remaining option is the winner.
 
The BTR-IRV method was originally proposed by [[User:Legrand|Rob LeGrand]] in 20062002, and first referred to by that name by [[Jan Kok]] in 2005.<ref>{{cite nameweb|title="Re:0">[ IRV-Condorcet Compromise?|last=LeGrand|first=Rob|website=Instantrunoff-freewheeling Yahoo Group archives|url=https://election-methodsmunsterhjelm.electorama.narkive.comno/km/LKfc52OIyahoo_lists_archive/aninstantrunoff-examplefreewheeling/all_messages/instantrunoff-offreewheeling_0465.eml|date=2002-btr12-stv#post4 election-methods mailing list: An example of BTR-STV]20}}</ref><ref>[{{cite web|title="Better" IRV?|last=Kok|first=Jan|website=ApprovalVoting Yahoo Group archives|url=https://wwwmunsterhjelm.mail-archive.comno/electionkm/yahoo_lists_archive/ApprovalVoting/web/2005-methods@electorama.comJuly/msg01311msg00039.html <nowiki>[EM] DH3 |date=2005- error by me - should prefer BTR07-IRV to Schulze beatpaths?</nowiki>]26}}</ref> It was conceived as a modification to standard [[Instant-runoff voting|Instant-runoff voting (IRV)]] which ensures the runoff doesn't ever eliminate a Condorcet Winner (and in fact, never eliminates all candidates in the [[Smith set]], since a Smith set member can never be eliminated in a runoff against a non-Smith set member). Thus, the method passes the [[Condorcet Criterion]] and the [[Smith criterion]], ensuring it functions as a [[Condorcet method]].
 
A benefit of BTR-IRV is that first choices are honored in the elimination process, so that a polarizing candidate can survive to later rounds until they have a single opponent who they can be individually compared to. This attribute and ease of explaining the system makes it less prone to claims of fraud than other systems for resolving the [[Condorcet paradox]].
 
This system is a form of [[Single transferable vote|single transferable vote (STV)]], and may be referred to by the more general name '''BTR-STV''', though the multi-winner variant was not originally recommended by LeGrand.<ref>{{cite nameweb|url="http:0"//lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2006-June/116339.html|title=An example of BTR-STV|website=Election-methods mailing list archives|date=2006-06-08|last=LeGrand|first=Rob}}</ref>
 
===An example===
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